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“[T]he arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward 
justice.”
Martin Luther King, Jr., from speech “Our God is 
Marching On” (Montgomery, Alabama, March. 25, 
1965)1
“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in 
our own times.”
Justice Anthony Kennedy, Obergefell v. Hodges2
“Minorities trampled on by the democratic process have 
recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional 
law.”
Judge Richard Posner, Baskin v. Bogan3
                                                     
1. A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR. 131 (Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard, eds., 2001) (paraphrasing 
abolitionist THEODORE PARKER, TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 84-85 (1853)). 
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).  
3. 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
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INTRODUCTION—CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY AND STORYTELLING
A. Legal Analysis Bound to History 
Legal analysis in the United States is inherently historical in 
nature. Our robust doctrine of stare decisis ensures that the 
jurisprudence of the past has continuing force absent compelling 
reasons to change course.4 Moreover, judicial interpretation of 
general or ambiguous language in legislative or constitutional texts 
often entails journeys to previous centuries in search of legislative 
history, historical context, and other clues to drafters’ apparent 
intent.5
While judges look to the past to guide their decisions in the 
present, they also keep a wary eye on the future. They consider the 
implications of their decisions on cases yet to be filed, lest a decision 
today might send the law down a slippery slope toward unintended 
consequences or difficult line drawing in future cases.6
Arrayed against these conservative bonds are more progressive 
forces seeking to break from the past. Legislative history might 
reveal not an original intent to adopt a static meaning, but instead a 
legislative intent to delegate to the courts the task of adapting the 
meaning of a text to meet the changing needs and circumstances of 
society.7 Moreover, “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command,”8
                                                     
4. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 
(2010) (“Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons 
demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.”).
5. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599-603 (2008) 
(consulting numerous primary and secondary authorities from the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, to shed light on the meaning the Second 
Amendment); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) 
(adopting views about ethnic classifications in the nineteenth century, as revealed in 
legislative history, to define racial discrimination in Civil War era statute).  
6. E.g., Britell v. United States, 372 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(declining to embark on the “slippery slope” of deciding that the state has no interest 
in potential human life in a fetus with anencephaly, because it will force courts in 
similar cases to engage in “line-drawing . . . for which courts are ill-equipped”). 
7. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 & n.2 (1983) (inferring 
nineteenth century congressional intent to permit courts to take guidance from tort 
principles as they have evolved, rather than as frozen at the time of enactment); see 
also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (considering “public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life,” 
rather than “turn[ing] the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was 
adopted”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (stating that First, Second, and Fourth 
Amendments apply to “modern forms of communications,” modern techniques of 
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so courts do overrule their own precedents in the proper 
circumstances.9 And even when the conditions dictated by stare 
decisis for abandoning precedent10 have not been met, the precise 
meaning and reach of retained precedent is frequently subject to 
reasonable debate.11
Accordingly, judicial decision-making looks to both the past 
and the future to guide the present, and it often navigates between a 
bold search for justice and cautious reticence to rock the boat. That 
reticence stems partly from our system’s separation of powers, 
counseling a degree of judicial deference to the legislature or the will 
of voters, when an issue is the subject of widespread democratic 
deliberation.12 But, if deliberation leads to majoritarian oppression of 
a minority group, the judiciary has an obligation to act boldly to 
protect minority rights.13
The thesis of this Article is that past civil rights movements in 
the United States define broad historical patterns that form a 
narrative helpful to a proper understanding of new controversies. In 
essence, as a society, we often could benefit from a reminder that our 
                                                                                                               
searching, and “all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were 
not in existence at the time of the founding”). 
8. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (emphasis omitted).  
9. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363-65 (stressing the importance of stare 
decisis, but nonetheless, overruling precedent).  
10. See, e.g., id. at 362-63 (summarizing criteria for abandoning precedent); 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55, 866-68 (1992) (summarizing 
criteria in greater detail).  
11. See, e.g., People v. Carney, 668 P.2d 807, 808, 810, 814 (Cal. 1983) 
(finding that motor home did not fit within the automobile exception to warrant 
requirement), rev’d sub nom. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389 (1985) 
(differing from California Supreme Court regarding the reach of relevant precedents 
and extent of the privacy interests in motor vehicles). 
12. E.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 800-04 (Conn. 2011) 
(identifying legislature as the appropriate body to address public policy issues raised 
by surrogate mother agreements, but judicially resolving narrow issue by 
interpreting existing statute); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Local 38, 726 P.2d 538, 541-44 
(Cal. 1986) (deferring to legislature to resolve policy issues in field of public 
employee strikes, and thus refraining from developing common law tort liability for 
strike assumed to be illegal).  
13. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (the view of the 
governing majority in a state that homosexual intimacy is immoral does not justify 
state criminal law); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (holding 
that Fourteenth Amendment includes the “right to exemption from unfriendly 
legislation” targeting African-Americans); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th 
Cir.) (“Minorities trampled on by the democratic process have recourse to the 
courts; the recourse is called constitutional law.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 
(2014). 
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actions today will form the history for future generations, who will 
judge us with benefit of hindsight and a broader perspective. With 
each new civil rights controversy, we owe it to ourselves and to the 
victims of discrimination to ask whether we are once again in a 
period of transition, where conventional mores of the present will 
soon sound as jarring as this passage from Justice Bradley’s
concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois14 sounds to us now:  
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man 
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it 
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family 
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to 
say identity, of interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the 
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct 
and independent career from that of her husband. 
. . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.15  
The recent history of litigation over marriage equality provides a
good example for analysis and discussion. This Article argues that 
marriage equality fits within a recognizable historical pattern within 
the United States, a pattern first of denying a civil right, then 
recognizing the right, and later wondering—with some 
embarrassment—how we could ever have voiced uncertainty about 
the right.  
The remaining issue is whether this civil rights narrative can 
and should be explicitly incorporated into written advocacy in 
pending cases in a time of transition, in an effort to minimize the 
delay in recognizing an important civil and human right. This Article 
argues that a broad historical perspective can advance a novel claim 
in some types of civil rights litigation, perhaps as a narrative that can 
serve as an underlying theme of a brief.16
                                                     
14. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872), abrogated by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974) (municipal regulations that categorically required 
female teachers to take maternity leave several months prior to expected birth, 
without individualized assessment of ability to work, was not rationally related to 
legitimate state interest and thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
15. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).  
16. See generally CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING
354-56 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing the technique of embedding a theme into a brief, 
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B. The Civil Rights Narrative as a Tool of Persuasion 
Narrative in litigation frequently takes the form of telling the 
client’s story.17 In marriage equality litigation, the record often 
contains compelling stories about the lives of same-sex couples: their 
aspirations as partners and parents and the burdens they face when 
denied the rights and dignity that a marriage license affords.18 Some 
judicial decisions finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage 
have reproduced these client stories in the opinions.19
But stories are also embedded in the law itself20 and its 
development over time,21 sometimes revealing the deeply seated 
                                                                                                               
to underscore the fairness or justice of a position or encourage a judge to adopt an 
approach or perspective); RUTH ANN ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN & KEN CHESTEK,
YOUR CLIENT’S STORY: PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING 292 (2013) (“While every case 
requires a sound legal theory, the client is better served by the lawyer including an 
appealing theme as well.”).
17. See, e.g., ROBBINS, JOHANSEN & CHESTEK, supra note 16, at 292; Ruth 
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story 
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 767, 767-68 (2006); JONATHAN SHAPIRO, LAWYERS, LIARS, AND THE ART 
OF STORYTELLING 125 (2014) (“The client will be your story’s central character, or 
at least one of them.”). 
18. E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 6-12, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 860738 (telling the stories of the lives and 
relationships of petitioning same-sex couples); Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in 
Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2005) (summarizing the plaintiffs’ 
perspective set forth in the complaint in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)); Beth Robinson, The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex 
Couples: Lessons from Vermont, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 237, 252-53 (2001) 
(quoting preamble of Vermont bill to recognize civil unions, which referred 
generally to the stories of same-sex couples, drawing parallels to the lives of 
opposite-sex, married couples).  
19. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2595 (summarizing stories showing that the 
petitioners “seek not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives, or honor 
their spouses’ memory, joined by its bond”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 368-
69 (4th Cir.) (summarizing the stories of plaintiff couples, including the burdens 
they faced because of the state ban on same-sex marriage), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
308 (2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (D. Or. 2014) 
(summarizing the plaintiffs’ stories, showing that they “share in the characteristics 
that we would normally look to when we describe the ideals of marriage and 
family”).
20. See Stephen Paskey, The Law Is Made of Stories: Erasing the False 
Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC:
JALWD 51, 52 (2014) (“[E]very governing rule demands a story: a story is 
embedded in the rule’s structure, and the rule can be satisfied only by telling a 
story.”); PHILIP N. MEYER, STORYTELLING FOR LAWYERS 2 (2014) (“It is impossible 
to make any legal argument, without telling some stories about the facts and about 
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cultural myths that help us make sense of the world, that sit in the 
background to influence us in our subconscious construction of right 
and wrong.22 Accordingly, a persuasive narrative may tell a story 
about the law itself.23
And, in turn, the law tells a story to society about what it deems 
to be right, just, and acceptable, and about what is excluded from that 
realm. As noted by one marriage equality advocate, 
[T]he law does more than simply delineate rights and obligations, or 
distribute benefits and burdens. The law also tells a story. It’s a story 
about who we are as a community, how we view ourselves, and how we 
view one another. . . . Before July 1, 2000, the story told by the laws of 
every state in this country was that committed, loving same-sex couples 
don’t exist, or if we do, our relationships have no value, and aren’t worthy 
of equal treatment under the law.24
The civil rights story examined in this Article is largely a story 
about our law and society, as they evolved together, and about the 
successes and failures of our law on the long road to justice and 
                                                                                                               
the law.”); Christy H. DeSanctis, Narrative Reasoning and Analogy: The Untold 
Story, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 149, 151 (2012) (advancing the 
argument that “many, if not most, forms of reasoning actually depend on narrative”); 
see also Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic 
Imagination in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7, 7 (1996) (exploring the 
relationship between narrative and rule-based reasoning, as well as other forms of 
reasoning).  
21. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 141 
(2000) (citing to Ronald Dworkin for the proposition that “a line of precedent is like 
a continuing story”).
22. See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi,
Myth, and the Master’s Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 46-59 (2013) 
(synthesizing the work of other authors); Paskey, supra note 20, at 69-70 (discussing 
other authors’ descriptions of stock knowledge structures). Of course, one can tell 
stories at both levels. Richard Boyd, for example, has examined the story of a 
sentenced defendant as told by the Supreme Court when upholding California’s 
“three strikes” sentencing law, contrasting it with the story told by the defendant’s 
appellate lawyer, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. Richard Boyd, Narratives of Sacrificial 
Expulsion in the Supreme Court’s Affirmation of California’s “Three Strikes and 
You’re Out” Law, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 83, 94 (2014). At a higher 
level, however, Boyd’s article tells its own story about “an avenging criminal-justice 
system.” Id. at 86. 
23. See, e.g., Paskey, supra note 20, at 66 (explaining that stories can 
encompass plots that center around inanimate objects, and the concept of character 
should be broad enough to encompass “stories about the law itself”) (citing to Derek 
H. Kiernan-Johnson, A Shift to Narrativity, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 
81, 89 (2012); Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and 
Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 883, 884 (2010)).  
24. Robinson, supra note 18, at 240. 
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equality. It ends by concluding that references to the arc of civil 
rights history can advance advocacy in contemporary civil rights 
movements, by revealing parallels to previously recognized civil 
rights and to previously rejected grounds for resistance to civil rights.  
This Article reaches that destination through the following 
steps. Part I summarizes the history of same-sex marriage litigation 
in cases raising constitutional challenges to legislative exclusions of 
same-sex marriage, or to legislative bans on recognizing same-sex 
marriages validly concluded in other states. Part II examines several 
examples of points of indeterminacy in the constitutional analysis, 
demonstrating how judges could rationally rule either way on the 
constitutional challenge, hence presenting opportunities for 
advocating for a result based on broader conceptions of justice and 
the issue’s place in history. Part III presents a civil rights history, 
places marriage equality litigation within that history, and seeks to 
demonstrate that an analysis of each new civil rights claim would 
benefit from an appreciation of previous civil rights struggles. 
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
A. Breaking Free of Baker v. Nelson (1971) 
It may come as a surprise to some that in 1971 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled on the merits of a same-sex marriage case, in 
Baker v. Nelson.25 Tellingly, in Baker the Court summarily upheld a 
same-sex marriage ban five years after it had invalidated a state ban 
on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia26 and three years after 
the Stonewall riots had inspired the movement for gay rights.27
In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected federal equal 
protection and due process challenges to a state statute that it 
interpreted to disallow same-sex marriages.28 It set the tone for its 
opinion with a reference to tradition of especially long standing: 
“The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely 
                                                     
25. 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). 
26. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
27. See generally, e.g., DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT 
SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION (2004); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
413 (6th Cir. 2014) (referring to the events precipitating the Stonewall riots as an 
example of prejudice against the gay community), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584. 
28. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810, overruled by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is 
as old as the book of Genesis.”29
The Minnesota Court then distinguished Griswold v. 
Connecticut,30 which had recognized a privacy interest in a married 
couple’s decision to use contraceptives. It opined that the substantive 
due process right in Griswold was premised on the state having 
intruded on an existing marital relationship that it had previously 
authorized.31 It also concluded that the state did not deny equal 
protection by rejecting same-sex marriages while permitting 
opposite-sex marriages without any inquiry into the couple’s
capacity or willingness to procreate.32 It distinguished Loving v. 
Virginia by finding “in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, 
. . . a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely 
upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”33
On Baker’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court summarily dismissed the appeal in a single sentence: “The 
appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.”34 That 
summary disposition constituted a decision on the merits, and it 
bound lower courts35 with respect to issues “properly presented”36 to 
the Court, “‘except when doctrinal developments indicate 
otherwise.’”37  
                                                     
29. Id. at 186 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942), and quoting its linking of marriage to procreation and “survival of 
the race”).
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
31. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87 (citing the majority opinion of Griswold,
381 U.S. at 482, 485, and Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion, id. at 496). 
32. Id. at 187. 
33. Id. The court quoted a passage from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967), which referred to the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment and to 
a deprivation of liberty without due process. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
34. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). Further litigation by one member of the 
same-sex couple in Baker is reviewed in Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923, 929 
n.5 (W.D. Mo. 2014). 
35. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). 
36. Id. at 345 n.14; see also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176-77 
(1977) (stating that such a dismissal binds lower courts on “the precise issues 
presented and necessarily decided”).
37. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344 (quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective 
Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967)); cf. Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (explaining that 
lower courts should follow the holdings of full opinions of the Supreme Court 
regardless of doctrinal developments). 
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Forty-two years after the Supreme Court’s summary 
disposition in Baker, intervening Supreme Court case law—
culminating in United States v. Windsor38—had so undermined the 
judgment in Baker that, after Windsor, lower courts nearly 
universally determined that they could entertain federal due process 
and equal protection challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage, 
free of the bonds of Baker.39 But, in 1986, the Court’s decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick40 had threatened to derail that doctrinal 
progression. 
In Bowers, the Supreme Court held that the United States 
Constitution erected no barrier41 to a Georgia law criminalizing the 
act of sodomy in the privacy of the bedroom of the respondent’s
home.42 The Court had previously recognized a constitutional right to 
privacy in various contexts,43 but it declined to find a substantive due 
                                                     
38. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
39. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 467 (9th Cir. 2014); Pareto v. 
Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 899, 901 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014) (observing that, as of 
July 25, 2014, all cases that had addressed Baker since Windsor, numbering more 
than twenty, had viewed Baker to be undermined by doctrinal developments); see 
also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373 (4th Cir.) (citing to eleven federal cases 
reaching the same conclusion, and describing them as consistent conclusions from 
every federal case addressing Baker since Windsor and up to July 29, 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 308, 308 (2014); Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1288 
(S.D. Ala. 2015). Some courts have proceeded to the merits without discussing 
Baker. See generally, e.g., Brassner v. Lade, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 920a (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. 2014). Between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Obergefell, a few 
courts concluded that Baker still had some bite, apparently on the basis that it would 
not lose its precedential force unless clearly overruled, rather than simply 
undermined by intervening authority. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 
2014) (finding that Baker had not been overruled), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. 2584; Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014CV36, slip op. at 2-3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
Aug. 5, 2014) (finding Baker not overruled “[f]or purposes of passing this issue to 
the appellate courts without discussion”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
40. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
41. Id. at 190-96 (finding no fundamental right at stake, and finding a 
rational basis for the statute).  
42. Id. at 188. 
43. Justice White’s opinion described the relevant precedent in the 
following way: 
The reach of this line of cases was sketched in Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), 
and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), were described as dealing 
with childrearing and education; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944), with family relationships; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), with procreation; Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967), with marriage; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
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process right to private, consensual same-sex intimate relations,44 and 
it held that a state legislature’s judgment that same-sex intimacy is 
immoral, without more, provided a rational basis for its criminal 
regulation.45 The Court distinguished its decision in Stanley v. 
Georgia:46 although Stanley had reversed a state conviction for 
possessing and reading obscene material in the privacy of the 
defendant’s home, “the decision was firmly grounded in the First 
Amendment,” and thus had no applicability to the conduct in 
Bowers.47
In a dissent joined by three fellow justices, Justice Blackmun 
criticized the majority’s reliance on long-standing moral 
condemnation of homosexuality in the general community48 and in 
religious doctrine.49 Justice Blackmun argued for recognition of “the 
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of 
their intimate associations with others,”50 explaining: 
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through 
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as 
diverse as ours, that there may be many “right” ways of conducting those 
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come 
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these 
intensely personal bonds.51
Bowers stood for seventeen years until the Court overruled it in 
2003, in Lawrence v. Texas.52 According to the Lawrence majority, 
                                                                                                               
(1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 403 U.S. 438 (1972), with contraception; 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), with abortion. The latter three 
cases were interpreted as construing the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide 
whether or not to beget or bear a child. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89. 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
44. Id. at 190-95; see also id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding no 
substantive due process right, but noting that a conviction and maximum sentence 
under the state law could raise an Eighth Amendment issue). In dissent, Justice 
Blackmun noted that the state statute criminalized sodomy whether practiced by 
opposite-sex or same-sex couples, leading Blackmun to question “the Court’s almost 
obsessive focus on homosexual activity.” Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
45. Id. at 196. 
46. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
47. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. 
48. Id. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 211-12. 
50. Id. at 206. 
51. Id. at 205 (citing primarily to Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of 
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980)). 
52. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today.”53
The opening paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Lawrence suggested that the Court in Bowers had failed to 
appreciate the scope of the liberty interests already reflected in case 
law54 as well as the full implications of Stanley v. Georgia regarding 
state regulation of consensual conduct in the privacy of one’s home:55
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into 
a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.56
In further support of the majority’s view that Bowers was 
wrong when decided, Justice Kennedy embraced a passage from 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers, one that rejected popular moral 
disapproval as a basis for diminishing liberty interests: 
“Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law 
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual 
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by 
unmarried as well as married persons.”57  
In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor concurred with the judgment 
but relied on equal protection because the Texas statute—unlike the 
Georgia statute at issue in Bowers—criminalized sodomy only if 
practiced by members of the same sex.58 Employing equal protection 
principles to void the statute would remove the need to overrule 
Bowers.59 The majority, on the other hand, preferred to measure the 
                                                     
53. Id.  
54. Id. at 562. 
55. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
57. Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 566 (majority 
opinion) (distinguishing the Georgia and Texas statutes). 
59. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Texas statute against liberty interests protected by substantive due 
process, thus directly confronting Bowers, and avoiding questions 
about whether an equal protection infirmity in the statute could be 
cured by extending its provisions to opposite-sex couples.60
The Lawrence majority reviewed several pre-Bowers
precedents that supported a broad conception of substantive due 
process protecting liberty interests related to privacy: three decisions 
relating to access to contraception61 and recognition in Roe v. Wade62
of a woman’s qualified right to elect an abortion.63 These were 
buttressed by two post-Bowers cases: Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,64 and Romer v. Evans.65
Casey reaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade,
protecting the qualified right to abortion. Lawrence interpreted Casey
to “again confirm[] that our laws and tradition afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”66
In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the 
Colorado state constitution, adopted by referendum, which 
prohibited all state or local government action designed to prevent or 
redress discrimination on the basis of homosexual orientation.67 The 
amendment placed gay and lesbian Coloradans in a “disfavored legal 
status” that made it more difficult for them to “seek aid from the 
government”68 simply “to make them unequal to everyone else.”69
Although the Supreme Court applied equal protection principles,70 it 
found a constitutional defect that applies as well to substantive due 
process: the absence of a legitimate state interest, and therefore no 
valid interest to which to link the regulation under any level of 
                                                     
60. Id. at 574-75 (majority opinion). 
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (establishing 
married couple’s right to privacy in using contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (invoking equal protection principles to affirm the privacy 
right of an individual, married or single, to gain access to contraceptives); Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977) (invalidating a state law 
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen). 
62. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).  
63. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66. (citing also to Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). 
64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
65. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
67. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626-27. 
68. Id. at 633. 
69. Id. at 635. 
70. Id. at 631-32, 635. 
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scrutiny.71 In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the majority 
found that the Colorado amendment simply reflected animosity 
toward the disfavored class, which did not constitute a legitimate 
state interest.72 It gave careful consideration to the amendment and its 
constitutionality because it was “of an unusual character,”73 and “not 
within our constitutional tradition.”74  
On the basis of trends in the law and society,75 the Lawrence
majority concluded, “[t]he rationale of Bowers does not withstand 
careful analysis.”76 It recognized that stare decisis is essential to 
stability in the law but “is not an inexorable command.”77 It instead 
embraced a constitutional concept of personal autonomy articulated 
in Casey:  
“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”
. . . 
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.78
The Lawrence majority took pains to limit its holding, 
specifically reserving the issue of same-sex marriage bans for 
another day: “[The present case] does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”79 In his dissenting opinion, 
however, Justice Scalia ruefully opined that the rationale of the 
majority opinion would encompass a right to state recognition of 
same-sex marriage unless “principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court.”80
For most lower courts, the decisive step in the undermining of 
Baker v. Nelson was the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United 
                                                     
71. Id. at 632-35. 
72. Id. at 634-35 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)). 
73. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)). 
74. Id.  
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-77 (2003). 
76. Id. at 577. 
77. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
78. Id. at 573-74 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)). 
79. Id. at 578; see also id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ther 
reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval 
of an excluded group.”).
80. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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States v. Windsor,81 striking down the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.82 Justice Kennedy once again authored the majority 
opinion,83 which dissenting Justice Scalia described as presenting 
“rootless and shifting” justifications84 and “scatter-shot rationales.”85
Although the principal rationale of the majority opinion in 
Windsor is difficult to pin down, a few observations are fairly safe. 
First, the majority acknowledged the historically central role of states 
in defining marriage, and noted that DOMA exceeded the traditional 
role of the federal government in domestic relations when it denied 
recognition of a state-sanctioned same-sex marriage for purposes of 
applying more than 1,000 federal laws, including tax laws, as well as 
federal regulations.86 To the extent that the majority relied on these 
federalism principles, its decision could buttress Baker v. Nelson
rather than undermine it, because Windsor could stand for deference 
to state marriage laws in the face of substantial intrusion from 
Congress, and it might be interpreted to suggest limits to federal 
constitutional intervention as well.87
But, despite the contrary hopes of dissenting Justices,88 the 
majority expressly disavowed grounding its decision on federalism 
principles: “Despite these considerations, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the 
Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.”89 Instead, the 
majority explained that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal 
protection principles”90 by imposing “a disadvantage, a separate 
                                                     
81. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
82. Id. at 2693-96.
83. Id. at 2682.
84. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 2709. 
86. Id. at 2689-92 (majority opinion). 
87. See, e.g., id. at 2696-97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (pressing an 
interpretation of the majority opinion to rest on federalism principles and 
emphasizing that the constitutionality of a state’s banning same-sex marriage is not 
before the court). 
88. Id.; see also id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that courts should 
adopt Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the majority opinion, see id. at 2696-
97, but predicting that they will not); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 414 (6th Cir. 
2014) (concluding that Windsor was necessarily grounded on federalism principles), 
rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
89. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
90. Id. at 2693 (citing to Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 
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status, and so a stigma” on members of a class to which the state had 
granted the “equal dignity of same-sex marriages.”91
Echoing Romer, Justice Kennedy gave careful consideration to 
possible constitutional infirmities, such as “an improper animus or 
purpose,”92 because DOMA represented “[d]iscrimination[] of an 
unusual character.”93 Congress enacted DOMA “as some States were 
beginning to consider the concept of same-sex marriage,”94 and it 
represented an “unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage.”95 After 
reviewing the text and history of DOMA, Justice Kennedy concluded 
that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,”96 and its “principal 
purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
governmental efficiency”97 but to “demean those persons who are in 
a lawful same-sex marriage.”98
According to the majority, these circumstances compelled the 
conclusion that “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the 
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.”99 The majority also found that DOMA violated the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, linking it to the 
liberty interest,100 because it “imposes a disability on the class” of 
persons in same-sex marriages recognized by states to help them 
“enhance their own liberty.”101 Accordingly, dissenting Justice Alito 
interpreted the majority’s decision to rest at least partly on both 
substantive due process102 and equal protection.103
                                                     
91. Id. at 2693 (“‘[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973))). 
92. Id. at 2693. 
93. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)); see also Id. at 
2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633) (explaining that DOMA “departs from [a] 
history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage”).
94. Id. at 2692.
95. Id. at 2693.  
96. Id. at 2694.
97. Id.  
98. Id. at 2695. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 2695-96.
102. Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority’s 
reference to “liberty of the person . . . suggests that substantive due process may 
partially underlie the Court’s decision today”).
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After Windsor, nearly every court that addressed the continuing 
precedential effect of Baker v. Nelson concluded that Baker had been 
undermined by subsequent Supreme Court case law and no longer 
bound lower courts.104
B. Marriage Equality in the States Since Baker v. Nelson
After courts from four states had rejected constitutional 
challenges to same-sex marriage from 1971 to 1984,105 the courts of 
Hawaii breathed new life into the judicial front of the movement for 
marriage equality. In 1993, in Baehr v. Lewin,106 a plurality of the 
court found that the state marriage statute, which limited marriage to 
opposite-sex couples, triggered strict scrutiny under an equal 
protection provision of the Hawaii Constitution that specifically 
prohibited sex discrimination.107 It remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with the plurality opinion.108 On 
remand, the trial court found that the marriage statute violated the 
state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, and it enjoined 
state officials from denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.109
The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed in 1997.110  
The backlash came swiftly. Congress enacted DOMA111 in 
1996, denying federal recognition to state-sanctioned same-sex 
                                                                                                               
103. Id. at 2716 (stating that the majority’s holding “seems to rest” on equal 
protection). 
104. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
105. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); 
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973), abrogated by 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1984), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 
1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.  
106. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion).  
107. Id. at 60-67. The plurality rejected a claim that the marriage statute 
violated a fundamental privacy interest protected by due process. Id. at 55-57. 
Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge James M. Burns, sitting by designation, 
concurred with the order remanding for further proceedings, but only on the ground 
that the constitutional issue should not be decided on an inadequate factual record. 
Id. at 68-69 (Burns, C.J., concurring). 
108. Id. at 68 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 74 (clarifying that, on motion 
for reconsideration or clarification, case is remanded for proceedings consistent with 
the plurality opinion).  
109. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Cir. Ct. of 
Haw. Dec. 3, 1996). 
110. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
111. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
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marriages, and allowing states to deny recognition to same-sex 
marriages lawfully performed in other states.112 In 1997, Indiana 
reenacted its same-sex marriage ban and added a provision denying 
recognition to same-sex marriages from other states.113 In 1998, 
Hawaii and Alaska adopted state constitutional amendments 
prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriage, seeking to place the 
question outside the reach of their state judiciary.114
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common 
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution prohibited state 
officials from depriving same-sex couples of a legal status that 
would provide them access to the legal benefits and protections 
accorded to opposite-sex married couples.115 Then, in 2003, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court determined in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,116 that the state’s ban on same-sex 
marriage failed even a rational relationship test under the equal 
protection and due process guarantees of the state constitution.117
Although the court hinted that its analysis would not necessarily 
transfer perfectly to a similar challenge under the federal 
constitution,118 its declining to rely on heightened scrutiny for equal 
protection and due process claims provided a simplified blueprint for 
challenging same-sex marriage bans.119
                                                     
112. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682-83 (2013) (quoting 
and describing statute). 
113. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 664 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
316 (2014). 
114. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998); see
Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAs as Political Process Failures: The Case for 
Heightened Scrutiny of State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 12, 14 (2014) (citing AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 33 
(2012)). 
115. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). The Vermont legislature 
satisfied this requirement by recognizing civil unions, which would provide equal 
benefits to same-sex couples. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014) (citing to An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 
§ 1(1)). 
116. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
117. Id. at 961-68. 
118. See id. at 959 (“[T]he Massachusetts Constitution is in some instances 
more protective of individual liberty interests than is the Federal Constitution . . . .”).
119. See id. at 959-68. For an excellent exploration of the Goodridge
decision, its implications and aftermath, within the larger context of the recognition 
of LGBT rights in Massachusetts, from the insider’s perspective of a GLAD 
attorney, see Bonauto, supra note 18.
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By this time, opponents of marriage equality were highly 
motivated and well organized. By 2008, nearly thirty states had 
enacted constitutional bans on recognition of same-sex marriage.120
The tide turned, however, with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Windsor. By 2014, eleven states had recognized same-sex marriage 
through legislative or popular vote.121 More tellingly, Windsor
launched a cascade of judicial decisions striking down state bans on 
same-sex marriage under the United States Constitution; as stated by 
a federal district court, “There is a growing national judicial 
consensus that state marriage laws treating heterosexual and same-
sex couples differently violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is 
this Court’s responsibility to act decisively to protect rights secured 
by the United States Constitution.”122  
Because Windsor addressed the constitutionality of a federal 
refusal to recognize a state’s decision to authorize same-sex 
marriage, it did not directly address the validity of a state’s decision 
to exclude same-sex marriage.123 Nonetheless, after Windsor, nearly 
all of the courts that addressed the constitutionality of state bans on 
same-sex marriage found state or federal constitutional violations in 
the bans.124 The Sixth Circuit’s contrary decision in DeBoer v. 
                                                     
120. Sanders, supra note 114, at 15 (citing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE 
CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 97 (2013)).  
121. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 644 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
122. Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1045 (S.D. Ohio), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
123. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“This opinion 
and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages” recognized by states and 
denied recognition by federal law.); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th 
Cir.) (noting that Windsor left open the question of the federal constitutionality of 
state same-sex marriage bans), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). But see Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (fearing that courts will not narrowly 
interpret the rationale of the Windsor majority). 
124. See, e.g., Pareto v. Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 899, 901 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. 2014) (observing that, as of July 25, 2014, all cases addressing the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, since Windsor, had found violations of 
state or federal constitutions); see also Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 
916 n.6, 927-28 (E.D. La. 2014) (disagreeing with sixteen federal cases since 
Windsor that had invalidated same-sex marriage bans under various levels of 
scrutiny), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. The only exceptions to these 
string of victories for same-sex marriage was Robicheaux, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 910, 
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 421, rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584, and Borman 
v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 2014) 
(finding rational basis for Tennessee’s mini-DOMA based on deference to voters 
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Snyder—rejecting a constitutional right to same-sex marriage—set 
the stage for Supreme Court review.125 Before examining the 
Supreme Court’s reversal of DeBoer in Obergefell v. Hodges,126 it 
will be instructive to examine the recent transition in social attitudes 
about same-sex marriage, and the doctrinal uncertainty that permitted 
judges on state and federal courts to reach different conclusions on 
the constitutional question, including those on a closely divided 
Supreme Court.  
C. Transition in Social Attitudes 
Although Congress has not succeeded in amending Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to bar employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation,127 the American population has for 
many years tended to accept equal rights in employment in much 
greater percentages than its acceptance of equal marriage rights for 
same-sex couples.128 To some extent, the greater controversy 
surrounding same-sex marriage may reflect a tendency by a 
significant percentage of the population to view state-sanctioned 
marriages partly through the lens of deeply held religious beliefs 
                                                                                                               
and legislature and on rational basis to encourage union that is viewed as best 
arrangement for procreation and child-rearing), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
2584. 
125. 772 F.3d at 421.  
126. 135 S. Ct. at 2608.  
127. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing to three congressional bills introduced in 1994, 1995, and 1996, 
and rejected). As of November 2014, the Senate had passed a bill prohibiting 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013). The House 
version of the bill remained in committee. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013).  
128. Compare GALLUP, Gay and Lesbian Rights,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Gay-Lesbian-Rights.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 
2015) (approval for same-sex marriage varying between approximately 36% and 
46% in the years 2001-2009), and id. (finding approval for constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage varying between 47% and 57% in the years 
2003-2008), with id. (finding support for equal employment rights without regard to 
sexual orientation varying between 85% and 89% in the years 2001-2008); see 
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (observing 
that Massachusetts law excluded same-sex marriage even after adopting laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a variety of contexts, 
such as employment, housing, and public accommodation).
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surrounding marriages sanctioned by their church.129 Accordingly, 
many courts have taken pains to explain that their analyses are 
limited to state-sanctioned civil marriage and have no effect on 
religious marriage ceremonies sanctioned by a church and restricted 
by religious tenets.130
Notwithstanding possible religious objections to same-sex 
marriage, the support for legal rights to same-sex marriage have 
increased in recent years, rising to 55% of those polled in 2014.131
Some evidence suggests that attitudes about same-sex marriage and 
other LGBT rights are generational,132 so that in a few decades, we 
                                                     
129. See GALLUP, supra note 128 (finding in 2012 that 47% who opposed 
same-sex marriage identified the reason, “Religion/Bible says it is wrong,” far ahead 
of next highest percentage, 20%, for the reason, without reference to religion, that 
“Marriage should be between a man and woman”); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 
at 948 (“Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that 
marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one woman . . . .”); 
Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1032 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in 
dissent) (“To many, same-sex relationships and same-sex marriages are contrary to 
religious teachings.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Geiger v. 
Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1143, 1146 (D. Or. 2014) (referring to widespread 
religious and moral beliefs and objections in the state population); see generally 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (legislative history of 
federal DOMA reflects intent to impose religious and moral views to limit definition 
of marriage). 
130. E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1227 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]oday’s decision relates solely to civil marriage . . . but religious institutions 
remain as free as they always have been to practice their sacraments and traditions 
as they see fit.”); Pareto v. Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 899, 900 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
2014) (“[T]his decision only affects civil marriage. It will not affect any religious 
institution’s rights involving marriage.”); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 
554 (W.D. Ky.) (noting “[t]hough each faith, minister, and individual can define 
marriage for themselves, at issue here are laws that act outside that protected 
sphere”), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d
sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1051 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 554), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer,
772 F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
131. GALLUP, supra note 128. After 2005, the polling question changed 
from asking about “marriages between homosexuals” to “marriages between same-
sex couples.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Moreover, support for same-sex marriage is 
growing among those with religious affiliations. Robert P. Jones, Attitudes on Same-
Sex Marriage by Religious Affiliation and Denominational Family, PUB. RELIGION 
RES. INSTIT. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://publicreligion.org/2015/04/attitudes-on-same-
sex-marriage-by-religious-affiliation-and-denominational-family/#.VZRr_WDFE9c 
(finding that religiously affiliated supporters now outnumber opponents, reflecting 
an increase in support of twenty percentage points since 2003). 
132. See, e.g., Growing Support for Gay Marriage: Changed Minds and 
Changing Demographics, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/03/20/growing-support-for-gay-marriage-changed-minds-and-
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likely will look back on the same-sex marriage debate the way that 
we now look back on controversies about racial integration and 
interracial marriage. 
II. CLASHING LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
In the many states that enacted state constitutional amendments 
barring same-sex marriage,133 court challenges required resort to 
federal constitutional guarantees under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.134 Challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment 
typically have sought to vindicate liberty interests, in the form of 
privacy interests, protected by substantive due process,135 frequently 
combined with equal protection claims.136
Majority and dissenting opinions in the lower courts reveal 
several points of analysis about which reasonable jurists could differ. 
A brief exploration of these points of controversy will help introduce 
a sharp division between the Supreme Court’s majority opinion and 
the dissenting opinions in Obergefell. More germane to the theme of 
this Article, the points of controversy will reveal the indeterminacy 
that could place any judge on the proverbial fence, in a position of 
indecision. When the precedent is thus uncertain in its application, an 
appeal to broad historical patterns might provide the impetus for 
choosing the application that avoids repeating the mistakes of the 
past and that continues the line of progress traced in the patterns.  
The following sections do not attempt to thoroughly analyze 
and resolve the merits of points of controversy. For purposes of this 
Article’s thesis, it suffices to identify issues that indicated 
uncertainty in the analysis prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell in June 2015. 
                                                                                                               
changing-demographics/ (finding in 2013 that 70% of those polled who were born 
after 1980 supported gay marriage, “far higher than the support among older 
generations”).
133. See, e.g., supra notes 109-14. 
134. See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1198-99 (invoking federal constitutional 
guarantees to invalidate state statutes and state constitutional amendment that state 
legislators and citizens had adopted in reaction to state court opinions allowing 
same-sex marriage). 
135. See, e.g., id. at 1207-08. 
136. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir.) (holding 
encompasses due process and equal protection), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).  
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A. Baker v. Nelson as Precedent with Continuing Force 
If it still had full force as precedent, Baker v. Nelson would 
have precluded courts, other than the U.S. Supreme Court itself, 
from employing federal equal protection or due process principles to 
invalidate a state’s ban on same-sex marriage.137 On the other hand, 
Baker’s summary dismissal of the appeal would have lost its binding 
force if intervening Supreme Court case law had undermined its terse 
determination that the appeal presented no substantial federal 
question.138  
Although nearly all courts since Windsor found Baker to be 
undermined by intervening case law,139 the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the Tenth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Kitchen v. Herbert140
illustrate points of good-faith debate.  
Writing for the majority in Kitchen, Circuit Judge Lucero 
concluded that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawrence and 
Windsor had undermined Baker.141 Judge Lucero emphasized the 
import of Windsor,142 which admittedly did not directly address the 
issue of state bans on same-sex marriage.143 He brushed aside 
arguments that Windsor was grounded on federalism principles and 
seized on Windsor’s references to the indignity, stigma, and other 
injuries visited by the federal DOMA of legally married same-sex 
couples, injuries similar to those denied same-sex marriage by the 
State of Utah.144
                                                     
137. See supra notes 28-29. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, not addressed 
in Baker, would remain available as a potential means of challenging a state’s denial 
of recognition of same-sex marriages legally performed in other states. See, e.g.,
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2014) (but finding that full faith 
and credit did not require a state to recognize same-sex marriages in violation of its 
own public policy), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 
(2015). 
138. See supra note 34. 
139. See supra notes 38-39. 
140. 755 F.3d 1193, 1228, 1240 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 
(2014). 
141. Id. at 1206, 1217. 
142. See id. at 1206-07. In section III of its opinion, the majority referred 
briefly to Lawrence’s affirmation of personal autonomy in intimate relations, but it 
discussed Windsor in approximately six paragraphs. See id. at 1205-07, 1213. 
143. Id. at 1206 (“We acknowledge that the question presented in Windsor is 
not identical to the question before us.”).
144. See id. at 1207-08. 
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Circuit Judge Kelly concurred with the majority that the 
plaintiffs had standing, but he dissented on the merits.145 He 
disagreed that the court could disregard the summary disposition of 
Baker, even if intervening case law had undermined Baker. Judge 
Kelly opined that lower courts must still wait for the Supreme Court 
to overrule its own precedent.146 He argued that the weaker 
application of stare decisis to a summary disposition of the Supreme 
Court applies only to the Supreme Court’s own reconsideration of 
the precedent and not to a lower court’s duty to adhere to the holding 
of the summary disposition: “Though the Supreme Court may not 
accord Baker the same deference as an opinion after briefing and 
argument, it is nonetheless precedential for this court.”147  
Applying the majority’s standards for sake of argument, Judge 
Kelly disagreed that Baker had been undermined by intervening case 
law.148 He characterized intervening case law, including Lawrence
and Windsor, as “[a]t best . . . ambiguous” and as “certainly [not 
compelling] the conclusion that the Supreme Court will interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment to require every state to extend marriage to 
same-gender couples, regardless of contrary state law.”149 Judge 
Kelly cited to a pre-Windsor decision of the First Circuit, holding 
that Romer and Lawrence did not undermine the binding effect of 
Baker.150
Although the dissent in Kitchen represented a minority view on 
the continuing force of Baker after Windsor,151 it did reveal a good-
faith controversy and uncertainty on that issue. It also suggests that 
                                                     
145. See id. at 1230 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
146. See id. at 1232 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
147. Id. at 1232 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 390 n.9 (1979)); 
see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 401 (6th Cir. 2014) (requiring overruling 
rather than simply undermining of Baker), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
148. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1232 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). In passing, Judge Kelly also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the issue 
in Kitchen was different from that in Baker because the Utah ban in Kitchen was 
direct and explicit in contrast to the marriage statute in Baker, which required 
interpretation. Id.  
149. Id. at 1232-33. 
150. See id. at 1233 (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
151. See supra note 147; see also DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 430 (Daughtrey, J., 
dissenting) (“If ever there was a legal ‘dead letter’ . . . [Baker] is a prime candidate. 
It lacks only a stake through its heart.”).
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disregarding Baker would have been a more challenging position to 
defend prior to Windsor.152
B. Level of Scrutiny 
Once a court deemed itself free to address due process and 
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, free of the 
bonds of Baker, it typically addressed the threshold issue of the 
appropriate level of scrutiny. Under the lowest, most deferential level 
of scrutiny, on a claim of either substantive due process or equal 
protection, a state law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.153 A state’s denial of a fundamental right, or 
its use of a suspect classification such as one based on race or 
national origin,154 triggers strict scrutiny,155 under which the law will 
be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest.156 Intermediate scrutiny in an equal protection analysis is 
triggered by a quasi-suspect classification, such as one based on sex 
or illegitimacy.157 Under intermediate scrutiny, a state law will be 
                                                     
152. See Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1205-06 (majority opinion) (citing two pre-
Windsor cases noting the binding effect of Baker on issues decided by Baker).
153. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (rational 
relationship test for due process if no fundamental liberty interest at stake); Clark v. 
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (rational relationship test under equal protection); 
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 460-65 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003) (applying rational relationship test in due process analysis of same-
sex marriage ban). 
154. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.  
155. E.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir.) (citing to Supreme 
Court authority for the proposition that “[u]nder both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, interference with a fundamental right warrants the application of 
strict scrutiny”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1218 
(citing to Supreme Court authority regarding strict scrutiny triggering fundamental 
rights under due process and suspect classifications under equal protection analysis),
cert. denied, 135 U.S. 265 (2014). 
156. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1218 (citing to Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993) (due process); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (equal 
protection)).  
157. E.g., Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 
879 (N.M. 2013) (stating that sensitive classifications, such as “persons with a 
mental disability,” trigger intermediate scrutiny under state law); id. at 880-85 
(noting that sex is viewed as a suspect classification under the state constitution, and 
finding that a classification based on sexual orientation triggers intermediate 
scrutiny under state law). 
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upheld if it is substantially related to an important government 
interest.158
The varying levels of scrutiny, and the rights or classifications 
that trigger them, have invited debate about how the standards apply 
to a state ban on same-sex marriage. Uncertainty surrounded 
questions such as whether the ban implicated a fundamental interest 
or a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and whether it served a legitimate 
governmental interest under even a rational basis review. 
1.  Fundamental Right Triggering Strict Scrutiny: Competing 
Analytic Frameworks 
Claims by same-sex couples that the state denied them a 
fundamental right gave rise to competing approaches to framing the 
issue and the analysis.  
Defendants or skeptical judges pointed to the statement in 
Washington v. Glucksberg159 that heightened scrutiny is reserved for 
“fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”160 They often conceded 
that the right to marry is a fundamental right,161 and one court even 
conceded that “recent history and tradition may also be relevant” to 
the inquiry.162 But they asserted that same-sex marriage is such a 
recent and still controversial phenomenon that it is hardly established 
in American history and tradition, whether in deeply rooted 
traditions or relatively recent history.163 Thus, they argued, plaintiffs 
                                                     
158. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (requiring careful 
inspection “[w]ithout equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to 
classifications based on race or national origin”).
159. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
160. See id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977)). 
161. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967)). 
162. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 977 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) 
(stating this point after referring to a decline in state laws banning interracial 
marriage at the time of Loving, and citing to Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5), abrogated 
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” (quoting County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
163. See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 979 (“[A]lthough marriage has evolved, 
it has not included a history and tradition of same-sex marriage in this nation or in 
Washington State.”); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 923 (E.D. La. 
2014) (“Public attitude might be becoming more diverse, but any right to same-sex 
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cannot claim a fundamental right to same-sex marriage,164 and a ban 
on same-sex marriage is subject to rational basis review.165
Plaintiffs and sympathetic judges have responded that 
defenders of the bans have misstated the issue: rather than ask 
whether plaintiffs have a right to “same-sex marriage,” courts should 
recognize the fundamental right to marriage and then apply strict 
scrutiny to laws that exclude same-sex couples from that right.166
They have observed that Loving v. Virginia did not ask whether the 
right to interracial marriage was deeply rooted in our nation’s
history; it instead recognized the “the freedom of choice to marry,”167
and then asked whether a state could deny this “fundamental 
freedom” on the basis of racial classifications.168 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                               
marriage is not yet so entrenched as to be fundamental.”), abrogated by Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. 2584. 
164. E.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 979 (characterizing as “astonishing” the 
dissent’s proposition that “there is a fundamental right to marry a person of the same 
sex”); Robicheaux, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 923 (“There is simply no fundamental right, 
historically or traditionally, to same-sex marriage.”); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 
F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that previous cases recognized a 
fundamental right to marry in various contexts, but always on the assumption of 
opposite-sex marriage), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Ex parte State 
ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *30-34 (Ala. Mar. 3, 
2015), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
165. E.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 980; Robicheaux, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 923. 
166. E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1216-26 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-
93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (determining that same-sex couples are not seeking a new right; 
they seek the same right to marry that opposite sex couples have enjoyed, a right to 
join an institution that has abandoned the starkly defined gender roles that it once 
encompassed), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011), 
vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (finding no 
standing to appeal); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 478-79 (majority opinion), 476-96
(Reinhardt, J., concurring) (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing Supreme Court case law on 
marriage and fundamental rights); see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-76 
(4th Cir.) (determining that Glucksberg’s requirement of grounding in history and 
tradition applies only to expanding the concept of fundamental rights, and not to 
established fundamental rights, like the right to marry), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 
(2014). 
167. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12). 
168. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 659 
(W.D. Tex. 2014) (noting that Loving found that the right to marry included 
interracial marriage, rather than finding a new right to interracial marriage); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (stating that 
Loving makes clear that “the right to marry means little if it does not include the 
right to marry the person of one’s choice”); Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 
1065 (D. Alaska 2014) (noting that Loving “hinged on” recognition of “the freedom 
to marry, without an additional descriptor”); Pareto v. Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly 
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Lawrence, the Supreme Court rejected the framing of the issue stated 
in Bowers as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,”169
stating that this framing in Bowers failed “to appreciate the extent of 
liberty at stake.”170 According to this line of argument, fundamental 
rights should not be defined in terms of those who have been 
excluded from them and are challenging the exclusion.171
This dispute about the proper analytic framework for 
identifying a fundamental right created uncertainty at an important 
juncture in the analysis. 
2. Heightened Scrutiny for Quasi-Suspect Class 
When advancing equal protection claims, some plaintiffs have 
sought to trigger heightened scrutiny either by (a) establishing sexual 
orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, or (b) characterizing 
bans on same-sex marriage as a form of sex discrimination, which 
triggers intermediate scrutiny under the federal equal protection 
clause172 and strict scrutiny under some state constitutions.173
a. Sexual Orientation as a Quasi-Suspect Class 
When invalidating the federal DOMA, the majority in Windsor
failed to provide clear guidance on its level of scrutiny, but its 
analysis led Justice Scalia to note in dissent that the majority “does 
not apply anything that resembles” deferential, rational basis 
                                                                                                               
Supp. 899, 899 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014) (drawing direct analogy between Loving’s 
holding and same-sex marriage rights). 
169. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1021 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003)). 
170. Id. at 1021-22 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67).  
171. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376-77 (noting that Loving and other Supreme Court 
decisions did not define fundamental rights in terms of the classes excluded); Henry 
v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1046 (S.D. Ohio) (“The Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to narrow the scope of the fundamental right to marry by 
[referring to] . . . the characteristics of the couple seeking marriage.”), rev’d sub 
nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972-73 (Greaney, J., 
concurring) (characterizing it as “conclusory” to “define the institution of marriage 
by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible”). 
172. See supra notes 155-56. 
173. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (plurality 
opinion) (interpreting state constitution prior to its amendment in 1998).
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review.174 When reading “the tea leaves of Windsor and its 
forebears,” one federal trial court was able to “apprehend the 
application of scrutiny more exacting than deferential,” leading it to 
cautiously conclude that “heightened scrutiny is, at minimum, not 
foreclosed” by Windsor when reviewing classifications on the basis 
of sexual orientation.175 After reviewing Windsor extensively,176 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated 
somewhat more confidently, “[a]t a minimum . . . Windsor scrutiny 
‘requires something more than traditional rational basis review.’”177
In light of uncertainty surrounding this issue, some courts have 
exercised caution by applying the rational basis level of review, 
requiring substantial deference to the legislature.178 Others have 
found a basis for intermediate scrutiny179 after applying the lodestar 
                                                     
174. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
175. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
176. Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480-83 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
177. Id. at 483 (quoting Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 
(2008)). 
178. E.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir.) (holding that, even 
if heightened scrutiny does not apply, discrimination against same-sex couples is 
irrational, “which is why we can largely elide the more complex analysis found in 
more closely balanced equal-protection cases”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); 
Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548-50 (W.D. Ky.) (applying rational basis 
test in light of uncertainty in Windsor, but finding that state law failed this 
deferential test), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 406 (6th Cir. 
2014) (finding no constitutional violation after applying an extremely deferential 
rational basis review, which was satisfied despite “foolish, sometimes offensive, 
inconsistencies that have haunted marital legislation from time to time”), rev’d sub 
nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Andersen v. King Cty., 
138 P.3d 963, 980 (2006) (applying rational basis test in pre-Windsor case), 
abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; see generally Baskin, 766 F.3d 648 
(finding no need to apply heightened scrutiny, because states’ bans on same-sex 
marriage fail the rational basis test); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (determining, in pre-Windsor case, that the court could apply 
heightened scrutiny to same-sex marriage ban as sex discrimination, but finding 
such scrutiny to be unnecessary because ban fails rational relationship test), aff’d 
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
179. E.g., Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 427-30 (applying the factors to 
sexual orientation and finding a quasi-suspect class warranting intermediate 
scrutiny); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987-91 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(applying the factors and adopting “a heightened scrutiny” to sexual orientation),
rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; see also id. at 978-79 (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
equal protection claim against law that does not recognize lawful same-sex marriage 
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factors relevant to determining suspect status: whether a group is 
politically powerless and has been subjected to a history of 
discrimination, and is defined by traits that are immutable or 
distinguishing and that bear no relation to ability to contribute to 
society.180
In some courts, classifications based on sexual orientation 
appear to have triggered a level of scrutiny in equal protection 
analysis that lies somewhere between rational basis review and 
intermediate scrutiny.181 Some judges have referred generally to 
“heightened” scrutiny,182 or have purported to test for a rational 
relationship but then have applied that test with less deference than is 
normally associated with the test.183
                                                                                                               
from other states while recognizing opposite-sex marriage from other states); 
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654 (“[M]ore than a reasonable basis is required because this is 
a case in which the challenged discrimination is, in the formula from the Beach case, 
‘along suspect lines.’” (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 
(1993))); cf. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871-72, 879 (N.M. 2013) (under state 
constitutional law, applying intermediate scrutiny to a “sensitive” classification).
180. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(citing to Supreme Court case law for each factor), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Baskin,
766 F.3d at 655, 657 (among other things, citing to studies about immutability of 
sexual orientation after raising issue about whether characteristic is “immutable or at 
least tenacious”); Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 427.  
181. See generally Sanders, supra note 114, at 25 (interpreting the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor to apply “a form of heightened 
scrutiny . . . sometimes called ‘rational basis with a bite’” but critiquing those cases 
for failure to clearly justify heightened scrutiny); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Court has applied “a more 
searching form of rational basis review” under equal protection analysis when state 
law reflects a “desire to harm a politically unpopular group”). 
182. E.g., Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (embracing “the conclusion that 
sexual orientation classifications should be subject to some form of heightened 
scrutiny”); id. at 991 (state ban must withstand “a heightened scrutiny analysis”).
183. As a benchmark, some judges have applied a traditional, highly 
deferential, rational basis test to same-sex marriage bans. E.g., Standhardt v. 
Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 461-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), 
abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 980-84 (finding 
rational basis on any conceivable state of facts, and leaving it to the legislature to 
resolve debates in the literature about optimal setting for child-rearing); Robicheaux 
v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 915-16, 922-23 (E.D. La. 2014), abrogated by
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1237-40 (10th Cir.) 
(Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (seeing no equal protection 
violation after applying highly deferential rational basis test), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014). Other judges, in contrast, have applied or advocated for a more 
searching level of scrutiny, while still referring to a rational basis test. See Andersen,
138 P.3d at 1015-16 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (applying rational basis test with 
“teeth” and with focus on whether excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
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b. Same-Sex Marriage Bans as Sex Discrimination 
Plaintiffs could more directly trigger intermediate scrutiny if 
they could establish that bans on same-sex marriage constitute a 
form of discrimination not just on the basis of sexual orientation,184
but on the basis of sex, in the sense of discrimination based on one’s
status as male or female.185 Attempts to do so have led to another 
duel between competing analytic frameworks. 
Opponents of the claim for sex discrimination have relied on a 
perspective that asks how a same-sex marriage ban affects broad 
populations of women and men. According to this argument, 
“traditional-marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of gender 
                                                                                                               
furthers the state’s purpose, rather than whether including opposite-sex marriage 
furthers that purpose); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960 n.20 
(Mass. 2003) (citing to Massachusetts and U.S. Supreme Court authority for 
proposition that rational basis test is not toothless); id. at 966 n.31 (deference to 
legislature must be balanced against court’s authority to decide constitutional 
questions); id. at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (“Although ostensibly applying the 
rational basis test to the civil marriage statutes, it is abundantly apparent that the 
court is in fact applying some undefined stricter standard.”); Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 
1237 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (charging that the district 
court “misunderstood the essence of rational basis review” and adopted a level of 
scrutiny that was inconsistent with “extreme deference, the hallmark of judicial 
restraint); cf. Huntsman v. Heavilin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 916, 918 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2014) (finding that proponents of state constitutional amendment harbored animus 
toward same-sex couples, justifying application of “the heightened rational basis 
test”).
184. One opponent of the claim for sex discrimination opines that same-sex 
marriage bans do not even discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation: “The 
marriage statutes do not disqualify individuals on the basis of sexual orientation 
from entering into marriage. All individuals, with certain exceptions not relevant 
here, are free to marry.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
However, “it is equally imprudent to conclude that the [Washington state] DOMA is 
not discriminatory because it affords homosexuals the ability to marry a person for 
whom they have no romantic or sexual attraction.” Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1035 n.11 
(Bridge, J., concurring in dissent). 
185. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (intermediate scrutiny for 
quasi-suspect class, such as sex). Another basis for disparate treatment, by state 
versions of DOMA, lies in a state’s recognizing a heterosexual marriage performed 
lawfully in another state but not a same-sex marriage from another state, thus 
discriminating against the same-sex couple rather than an individual within it. See,
e.g., Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85. This section, however, focuses on the 
theory that bans on same-sex marriage discriminates against an individual within the 
couple on the basis of that person’s sex.
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because all men and all women are equally restricted to marriage 
between the opposite sexes.”186
Proponents of the claim for finding sex discrimination respond 
that Loving v. Virginia rejected a group-based perspective when 
invalidating bans on interracial marriage.187 Specifically, Loving
rejected the argument that “racial classifications do not constitute an 
invidious discrimination based upon race” simply because they 
“punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an 
interracial marriage.”188 Although this passage refers only to a single 
interracial couple, the argument it rejects assumes equal application 
within the general population: Members of all races are prohibited 
from entering into marriage with a member of a different race. 
Loving proclaimed that “equal application does not immunize the 
statute” from the “heavy burden” of justifying a classification based 
on “race.”189
Accordingly, rather than focusing on equal application of a 
restriction to all members of a population, proponents of the claim 
for sex discrimination have argued that marriage is an individual 
right.190 They accordingly argued from a perspective that assumes a 
particular individual and then asks whether the statute discriminates 
on the basis of sex because of restrictions on who a person of that 
individual’s sex can marry:  
As a factual matter, an individual’s choice of marital partner is constrained 
because of his or her own sex. Stated in particular terms, Hillary 
Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because she (Hillary) is a 
woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry Richard Linnell because 
                                                     
186. Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, 
at *30 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; see also
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 969 (determining that Washington state’s “DOMA treats both 
sexes the same; neither a man nor a woman may marry a person of the same sex”); 
Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1233 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(finding no sex discrimination because ban operates similarly to male and female 
same-sex couples and does not disadvantage either as a class); Robicheaux, 2 F. 
Supp. 3d at 919 (“Louisiana’s laws apply evenhandedly to both genders—whether 
between two men or two women.”); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 71 (Haw. 1993) 
(Heen, J., dissenting) (explaining that the ban on same-sex marriage does not 
discriminate on the basis of sex, because “[a] male cannot obtain a license to marry 
another male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry another female”). 
187. E.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68.  
188. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). 
189. Id. at 9.  
190. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 n.15 
(Mass. 2003); see also id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring) (“[C]onstitutional 
protections extend to individuals and not to categories of people.”). 
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he (Gary) is a man. Only their gender prevents Hillary and Gary from 
marrying their chosen partners under the present law.191
In response, opponents of the sex discrimination claim point 
out that Loving’s analysis was premised on racial animus toward 
non-whites and a desire to maintain “White Supremacy,” whereas 
the bans on same-sex marriage did not reflect animus toward men or 
toward women.192
Thus, sex discrimination has provided a possible, but uncertain 
basis for triggering heightened scrutiny of a ban on same-sex 
marriage.193
                                                     
191. Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring); see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 
1037 (Bridge, J., concurring in dissent) (“A woman cannot marry the woman of her 
choice but a man can marry the woman of his choice . . . . [T]he only thing 
preventing plaintiff Heather Andersen from marrying her partner, Leslie Christian, is 
the fact that Andersen is a woman.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) 
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A woman is denied the right 
to marry another woman because her would-be partner is a woman, not because one 
or both are lesbians.”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 485-90 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, 
J., concurring) (discussing at length why bans on same-sex marriage represent 
discrimination on the basis of sex and sex stereotyping); Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. 
Supp. 3d 923, 934 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (“The State’s permission to marry depends on 
the genders of the participants, so the restriction is a gender-based classification.”). 
As recognized by some judges, a same-sex marriage ban can discriminate on the 
basis of both sex and sexual orientation. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that the two forms of discrimination were 
interrelated and equivalent), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 
2011), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also
Latta, 771 F.3d at 484-85 (Berzon, J., concurring) (explaining that a ban on same-
sex marriage operates most clearly as discrimination on the basis of sex, although it 
was intertwined with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
192. E.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 992 & n.13 (Cordy, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).  
193. A similar debate unfolded in the courts over interracial relationships as 
a form of race discrimination under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, although 
the weight of authority has sided with finding race discrimination on an 
individualized framework of analysis: An employer discriminates on the basis of 
race if it fires a White employee who married a Black spouse but would not have 
fired a Black employee who married the same spouse. E.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the 
World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing to other cases on 
either side of the debate). This theory could apply equally well to workplace bans on 
same-sex relationships: John would be fired if he had a romantic relationship with 
Paul, but Mary could date Paul without any consequences from her employer; thus, 
the employer is discriminating between John and Mary on the basis of John’s status 
as a male. E.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay 
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994). Unfortunately for 
proponents of this individualized approach in the Title VII context, courts initially 
rejected it for discrimination based on sexual orientation. E.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. 
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C. Degree of Appropriate Deference to Political Processes 
Aside from the substantial judicial deference to legislatures if a 
court subjects a law to rational basis scrutiny,194 judicial 
pronouncements sometimes reflect an extra degree of caution before 
cutting short public debate or interfering with a legislature’s
resolution of a contentious policy issue such as marriage equality.195
Dissenting in Lawrence, Justice Scalia invoked this concern in 
2003 to argue that the majority—in overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick—was taking a position in a culture war, a matter that 
should be left to democratic majority will.196 Three years later, the 
                                                                                                               
& Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979). These judicial interpretations then 
triggered congressional attempts to add sexual orientation to Title VII, which failed, 
thus signaling to courts that Congress did not intend to reach sexual orientation 
discrimination or to reverse judicial findings that such discrimination did not 
constitute sex discrimination. E.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 
257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). This legislative history, however, might not fully 
undermine a finding that an employer’s reaction to an employee’s homosexuality 
contributed to the employer’s sex discrimination in the form of unlawful sex 
stereotyping under the doctrine of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989). See, e.g., Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 115-16 (D. D.C. 2014) 
(complaint stated claim of sex discrimination by alleging that an employee’s 
homosexuality did not conform to his supervisor’s sex stereotypes about men); 
Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 465 (2004) (even otherwise gender-conforming gay or lesbian employees 
can be victims of sex stereotyping if they do not conform to the employer’s view 
that employees should be sexually attracted only to members of the opposite sex); 
Castello v. Donahoe, EEOC No. 0520110649, 2011 WL 6960810, at *2-3 (Dec. 20, 
2011) (on reconsideration, prohibiting sex stereotyping in an employer’s stereotype 
that a female employee should have sexual relationships only with men and not with 
women); see also Zachary R. Herz, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its 
Potential for Anti-Discrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 409 (2014) (exploring 
this and other applications of sex stereotyping).  
194. See supra notes 153, 178, 183 and accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., City & Cty. of S.F. v. United Assn. of Journeymen, 726 P.2d 
538, 541-43 (Cal. 1986) (complex public policy issues surrounding public employee 
labor relations counsels court to wait for legislative action rather than create 
common law action in tort for damages for illegal public employee strike); see also
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793-804 (Conn. 2011) (deciding narrow question 
through interpretation of statute, but leaving further public policy determinations on 
gestational agreements to legislature). But cf. id. at 816 (Zarella, J., concurring) 
(critiquing the majority for both formally deferring to legislative action and 
providing “the legislature with a detailed road map indicating how the law on 
gestational agreements should be clarified”).
196. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718-19 (2013) (Alito, J., 
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question of judicial deference to the legislatures surfaced in several 
opinions in the en banc decision of the Washington Supreme Court, 
upholding a state ban on same-sex marriage, in Andersen v. King 
County.197 The strongest reference to judicial deference was penned 
by Justice Johnson, concurring with the plurality’s decision 
upholding the state’s DOMA: “[W]here courts attempt to mandate 
novel changes in public policy through judicial decree, they erode 
the protections of our constitutions and frustrate the constitutional 
balance, which expressly includes the will of the people who must 
ratify constitutional amendments.”198 Similar sentiments appear in the 
plurality opinion199 and that of concurring Justice Alexander,200 both 
of which add some gentle encouragement for further democratic 
deliberation, and perhaps reconsideration, in the populace and 
legislature.201  
Similarly, when dissenting from the Massachusetts decision 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution, 
and in light of the numerous states banning same-sex marriage in 
2003, Justice Cordy argued in favor of waiting for greater national 
consensus before finding that fundamental interests were at stake: 
                                                                                                               
dissenting) (arguing that the majority is choosing between two theories of marriage, 
a matter best left to the legislative branch). 
197. 138 P.3d 963, 1010 (2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015). 
198. Id. at 998 (Johnson, J., concurring) (discussing the need to consult 
history and tradition to define fundamental interests); see also id. at 1003-04 (noting 
that DOMA reflects legislative effort to prevent judicial decisions from other states 
to dictate marriage policy in Washington); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 1050 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he issue presented here 
is a profound one, deeply rooted in social policy, that must, for now, be the subject 
of legislative not judicial action.”).
199. See Andersen, 138 P.2d at 968 (“[W]e have engaged in an exhaustive 
constitutional inquiry and have deferred to the legislative branch as required by our 
tri-partite form of government.”); see also id. at 969 (“[W]hile same-sex marriage 
may be the law at a future time, it will be because the people declare it to be, not 
because five members of this court have dictated it.”).
200. Id. at 991 (Alexander, C.J., concurring) (explaining that, by overturning 
the state DOMA, “we would be usurping the function of the legislature or the people 
as defined in article II of the constitution of the state of Washington”).
201. Id. at 968 (plurality opinion) (“We see no reason, however, why the 
legislature or the people acting through the initiative process would be foreclosed 
from extending the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples in Washington.”); id. at 
991 (Alexander, C.J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the opinion that I have signed . . . 
should be read as casting doubt on the right of the legislature or the people to 
broaden the marriage act or provide other forms of civil union if that is their will.”).
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As this court noted in considering whether to recognize a right of 
terminally ill patients to refuse life-prolonging treatment, “the law always 
lags behind the most advanced thinking in every area,” and must await 
“some common ground, some consensus.” . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . No State Legislature has enacted laws permitting same-sex 
marriages; and a large majority of States, as well as the United States 
Congress, have affirmatively prohibited the recognition of such marriages 
for any purpose.  
. . . In such circumstances, the law with respect to same-sex marriages 
must be left to develop through legislative processes, subject to the 
constraints of rationality, lest the court be viewed as using the liberty and 
due process clauses as vehicles merely to enforce its own views regarding 
better social policies, a role that the strongly worded separation of powers 
principles in . . . [the state] Constitution forbids, and for which the court is 
particularly ill suited.202
On the other hand, many judges have countered that courts cannot 
evade their responsibilities to protect minority rights and to decide 
difficult constitutional questions. Judge Posner has commented 
succinctly on the first responsibility: “Minorities trampled on by the 
democratic process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called 
constitutional law.”203 The Tenth Circuit addressed the second of 
these judicial responsibilities: 
As a matter of policy, it might well be preferable to allow the national 
debate on same-sex marriage to play out through legislative and 
democratic channels. . . . But the judiciary is not empowered to pick and 
choose the timing of its decisions. . . . We may not deny [the plaintiffs] 
relief based on a mere preference that their arguments be settled 
elsewhere. Nor may we defer to majority will in dealing with matters so 
                                                     
202. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 989-91 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 919-20 (E.D. 
La. 2014) (exercising judicial caution in the face of perceived uncertainty about the 
consequences of judicial interference with the democratic process), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
203. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir.) (referring to the 
operation of a state democratic process in which homosexuals made up only a tiny 
fraction of the population), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). The popular vote in 
favor of same-sex marriage in Ireland, in May 2015, stands as the only instance in 
which a majority of the electorate of a nation has approved marriage equality by 
popular vote, thus protecting the rights of a small minority of the electorate. Danny 
Hakim & Douglas Dalby, Irish Legalize Gay Marriage by Big Margin, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2015, at A1. 
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central to personal autonomy. The protection and exercise of fundamental 
rights are not matters for opinion polls or the ballot box.204
Indeed, precisely because they are shielded from the political 
forces that more directly influence the other branches of government, 
some courts have undertaken a special responsibility to protect 
individual rights.205 The California Supreme Court shouldered this 
responsibility when it invalidated that state’s ban on interracial 
marriage in Perez v. Lippold206 in 1948, almost two decades before 
Loving v. Virginia. Perez served as inspiration for the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in its recognition of a state constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage: 
When the Supreme Court of California decided Perez . . . racial inequality 
was rampant and normative, segregation in public and private institutions 
was commonplace, the civil rights movement had not yet been launched, 
and the “separate but equal” doctrine . . . was still good law. The lack of 
popular consensus favoring integration (including interracial marriage) did 
not deter the Supreme Court of California from holding that that State’s 
antimiscegenation statute violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 
Neither the Perez court nor the Loving Court was content to permit an 
unconstitutional situation to fester because the remedy might not reflect a 
broad social consensus.207  
Accordingly, in finding no likelihood of success in the State’s
defense of New Jersey legislation providing only civil unions to 
same-sex couples, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
State’s argument for giving “the democratic process ‘a chance to 
play out’ rather than act now”:
When courts face questions that have far-reaching social implications, 
there is a benefit to letting the political process and public discussion 
proceed first. . . . But when a party presents a clear case of ongoing 
unequal treatment, and asks the court to vindicate constitutionally 
protected rights, a court may not sidestep its obligation to rule for an 
indefinite amount of time. Under those circumstances, courts do not have 
the option to defer.208
                                                     
204. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.2d 1193, 1228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 265 (2014); see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1025 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]opular opinion cannot dictate our interpretation of the constitution.”), 
abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
205. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 875-76 (Iowa 2009) (discussing 
separation of powers under Iowa constitution). 
206. 198 P.2d 17, 27 (Cal. 1948). 
207. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 n.16. 
208. Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (2013) (internal 
citations omitted). 
1286 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1249 
Similarly, in finding federal due process and equal protection 
violations in a citizen-led ballot initiative that amended the state 
constitution to deny recognition to same-sex marriage, a Florida trial 
court rejected an argument that it defer to the “will of the voters”: 
While citizen-participation in government and the right to vote are the 
hallmarks of a democracy, it is also the judiciary’s responsibility to 
examine the constitutionally of the laws of this State when they are called 
into question. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). . . . This 
Nation and State . . . are constitutional democracies with certain principles 
enshrined into a governing text. A state’s constitution cannot insulate a 
law that otherwise violates the U.S. Constitution. . . . Accordingly, the 
“will of the voters” does not immunize [the state constitutional provision] 
from judicial review. . . . To hold otherwise would sanction the “tyranny 
of the majority.”209
In sum, the appropriate degree of judicial deference to the 
political process, when minority interests are implicated, is a matter 
of continuing debate and provided further grounds for division 
between jurists in same-sex marriage litigation. 
D. Obergefell v. Hodges—Clashing Legal Perspectives in the 
Supreme Court 
In Obergefell v. Hodges,210 a 5–4 decision, Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
                                                     
209. Pareto v. Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 899, 901 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014); 
see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he people’s will is not 
an independent compelling interest that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their 
fundamental right to marry.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014). The theme of 
protecting minority rights from the majority’s use of democratic machinery was 
echoed by another Florida trial court:  
This court is aware that the majority of voters oppose same-sex marriage, 
but it is our country’s proud heritage to protect the rights of the individual, 
the rights of the unpopular, and the rights of the powerless, even at the 
cost of offending the majority. . . . All laws, passed whether by the 
legislature or by popular support must pass [constitutional scrutiny], to do 
otherwise diminishes the Constitution to just a historical piece of paper. 
Huntsman v. Heavilin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 916, 919 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014); see 
also Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 876 (declaring that state constitutional rights must be 
enforced “even when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time 
unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be 
impervious to the passage of time”); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 436 (6th Cir. 
2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (stating that courts have the responsibility to 
ensure that rights are not “held hostage by popular whims”), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
210. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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Sotomayor, and Kagan. Building on the foundations he laid in 
Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor,211 Justice Kennedy relied on both 
due process and equal protection to find a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage,212 overruling its own dismissal of appeal in Baker 
v. Nelson.213 The majority opinion, however, contains only a single 
paragraph that independently discusses the equal protection 
analysis;214 the constitutional analysis focuses almost entirely on due 
process and on the interrelationship between due process and equal 
protection.215
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion invokes the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect fundamental 
liberties extending to “certain personal choices central to individual 
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs.”216 The opinion discusses “four 
principles and traditions” that explain the fundamental nature of the 
right to marry:217 (1) “the right to personal choice regarding marriage 
is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy;”218 (2) no other 
institution matches marriage in its importance to committed couples 
as a means of supporting their union;219 (3) marriage “safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education,”220 rights relevant to many 
same-sex couples who are raising children;221 and (4) “marriage is a
keystone of our social order,” forming “the basis for an expanding 
list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”222
Although the Court had previously established the right to marry in 
the context of opposite-sex unions,223 the Obergefell majority 
                                                     
211. See supra Section I.A.  
212. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. In three paragraphs near the end of the 
majority opinion, in Section V, Justice Kennedy explained that the same 
constitutional principles invalidated state laws that refused recognition of same-sex 
marriages validly concluded in other states. Id. at 2607-08. 
213. Id. at 2605 (overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)). For a 
discussion of Baker, see supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text. 
214. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
215. Id. at 2597-604. 
216. Id. at 2597.  
217. Id. at 2599. 
218. Id.  
219. Id. at 2599-600. 
220. Id. at 2600. 
221. Id. at 2600-01 (rejecting any conclusion, however, that “the right to 
marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children”). 
222. Id. at 2601. 
223. Id. at 2598. 
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concludes that these reasons “apply with equal force to same-sex 
couples.”224
In response, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent accuses the 
majority of engaging in the kind of judicial activism and intervention 
associated with the discredited decisions of the Court in Dred Scott
and Lochner v. New York.225 On a more specific plane, of the several 
clashing legal perspectives that had divided judges in state courts and 
lower federal courts,226 the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Supreme Court divide primarily on two issues: (1) whether a ban on 
same-sex marriage denies a fundamental right,227 and (2) whether 
courts should defer to ongoing democratic deliberation in political 
arenas on the issue of same-sex marriage.228
1. The Fundamental Right to Marry 
The respondents in Obergefell set the stage for the clash over 
fundamental rights by framing the petitioners’ claim as one for “a
new and non-existent ‘right to same-sex marriage,’” rather than for a 
general right to marry grounded in history and tradition.229 In his 
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts similarly notes that the 
precedent supporting a right to marry deals solely with opposite-sex 
marriages, and he characterizes the petitioners’ claim as one seeking 
“to make a State change its definition of marriage.”230
                                                     
224. Id. at 2599.  
225. Id. at 2615-19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the Court’s 
invoking due process to strike down the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451-52 (1856) and a state law regulating maximum hours for 
bakery employees in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905)). 
226. Because of the majority’s minimalist treatment of equal protection, the 
Justices did not address the issue of whether a ban on same-sex marriage constitutes 
a form of sex discrimination, triggering intermediate scrutiny, nor did it articulate 
the level of scrutiny generally appropriate for classifications based on sexual 
orientation. See supra notes 171-90 and accompanying text. The majority opinion 
characterizes the state laws as denying benefits to same-sex couples that are 
accorded to opposite-sex couples, and it refers to subordination of gays and lesbians. 
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604; thus, it appears to find an equal protection 
violation in a classification based on sexual orientation. To support any heightened 
scrutiny, however, it appears to rely on a state’s heavy burden to justify its exclusion 
of gays and lesbians from the fundamental right to marry, “[e]specially against a 
long history of disapproval of their relationships.” See id.
227. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
229. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 8). 
230. Id. at 2611, 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2640 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]t is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not 
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The majority opinion rejects the petitioner’s framing of the 
issue, noting that the Court’s precedent establishing the right to 
marry in various contexts has consistently recognized a general right 
to marry and then scrutinized exclusions from that right.231 Although 
marriage has been historically viewed as the “union of a man and a 
woman,” the majority opinion adopts the petitioners’ contention that 
the “cases cannot end there”:232 “If rights were defined by who 
exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as 
their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke 
rights once denied.”233
2. Deference to Democratic Deliberation 
But the greatest rift between the majority and dissenting 
opinions arises over the question of deference to democratic 
deliberation. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion emphasizes the 
responsibility of the Court to protect a fundamental right: “Of course, 
the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate 
process for change, so long as that process does not abridge 
fundamental rights.”234 The majority opinion treats democratic 
deliberation in the political arena not solely as a means to resolve an 
issue in various ways in different jurisdictions, but also as a means of 
informing the courts about an issue, to better enable courts to 
recognize and protect constitutional rights, with “an enhanced 
understanding of the issue.”235
In retort, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent proclaims, “this Court 
is not a legislature,” and argues that “debate about the content of the 
law is not an exhaustion requirement to be checked off before courts 
can impose their will.”236 Opinions authored by each of the remaining 
dissenting Justices characterize the majority opinion as a “threat to 
American democracy,”237 a “usurp[ation of] the constitutional right 
                                                                                                               
among” the rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))). 
231. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion) (citing to cases recognizing the right of 
interracial couples, inmates, and fathers owing child support to marry, without 
characterizing the asserted rights in terms of the excluded class).  
232. Id. at 2594, 2599. 
233. Id. at 2602. 
234. Id. at 2605.  
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2611, 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
237. Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of the people to decide,”238 and a means of “undermining the political 
processes that protect our liberty.”239
This author believes that the majority opinion reaches the right 
result in an exceedingly thoughtful opinion that will be regarded as a 
milestone in civil rights history. Nonetheless, the 5–4 split in the 
Supreme Court, with four passionate dissenting opinions, helps to 
reveal the indeterminacy of the legal issues. In light of that doctrinal 
uncertainty, a long view of civil rights history and the place of a civil 
rights claim within that history, might help our constitutional law to 
evolve in a way that later will withstand the judgment of history. 
III. IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY, TAKING GUIDANCE FROM A 
LONG VIEW OF CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY 
Windsor had so abruptly turned the tide in same-sex marriage 
litigation,240 one could almost sense by the end of 2014 that universal 
recognition of same-sex marriage in the United States was then 
inevitable and that lower-court judges felt they had permission to 
board the train toward that destination. Throughout 2014, the sense 
in our society was one of surprisingly rapid transition toward the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, both in the courts241 and in popular 
opinion.242
Of course, Windsor did not compel that conclusion in the 
Supreme Court.243 Moreover, prior to Windsor, in the decade after 
Lawrence, or in the two decades following Casey and Romer, courts 
adjudicating federal constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage 
bans were faced with evolving Supreme Court precedent that sent 
mixed signals.244 In the meantime, forty-five years had passed since 
the plaintiffs challenged the denial of a marriage license in Baker v. 
Nelson,245 and advances in the two decades after the successful 
                                                     
238. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
239. Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J. dissenting).  
240. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (showing majority 
popular support for same-sex marriage, and strong support among youth). Global 
momentum for same-sex marriage seemed to peak one month before the Supreme 
Court’s June 2015 decision in Obergefell, when the solidly Catholic country of 
Ireland approved same-sex marriage rights by popular vote. Hakim & Dalby, supra 
note 203. 
243. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 25-29, 34-37 and accompanying text. 
Advocacy for Marriage Equality 1291 
challenge in Baehr v. Lewin246 frequently drew a backlash that 
blocked or matched the advances.  
A cynic might argue that the pre-Windsor precedent dictated 
rejection of constitutional challenges to state bans on same-sex 
marriage, because it was not until Windsor that the Supreme Court 
finally and thoroughly undermined Baker v. Nelson. In the face of 
such an argument, however, one might remember Justice 
Blackmun’s dissenting commentary to the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of a substantive due process claim in a different context: 
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves the Court 
today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing 
legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case is an 
open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more 
broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced 
with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one which 
comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that 
compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.247
In light of the uncertainty inherent in evolving precedent, 
including the “clashing legal perspectives” examined in Part II, one 
wonders whether the lower courts could have turned the tide earlier, 
perhaps after Romer and Lawrence. If so, one might also wonder 
whether a long view of civil rights history could have helped to 
shape the argument and analysis.  
Section A below tells the story that places same-sex marriage 
rights within the arc of civil rights history. Section B explores the 
extent to which such a story should profitably be included in one 
form or another within formal advocacy. 
A. A Progression of Struggles for Civil Rights  
Each new civil rights struggle in the United States echoes 
familiar themes from previous movements. In the midst of each 
movement, the demand for rights runs against the grain of current 
social mores, generating controversy that seems jarring in subsequent 
generations, at which time we shake our heads in disbelief—or at
least dismay—at the resistance to rights that seem so self-evident in 
the later generation. Moreover, in a pattern that has repeated itself 
with surprising consistency, the resistance often has been stiffened 
with similar justifications, based on appeals to majoritarian views of 
                                                     
246. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
247. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212-
13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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tradition, morality, religion, and what is deemed to be consistent with 
the laws of nature.  
For example, nineteenth century case law refers to the blessing 
of the church for European enslavement of Native Americans and 
Africans, as purportedly legitimate treatment of “heathen” non-
Christians.248 Case law and other literature from that era refers to the 
ancient traditions of slavery,249 to Biblical and otherwise Divine 
support for slavery,250 and to the slave status of Africans and their 
descendants as their “natural position,”251 so much so that this status 
                                                     
248. Fable v. Brown, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 378, 393-94 (1835) 
(analogizing a slave’s rights to receive property to that of an enemy alien, and 
reviewing approval from church authorities for early enslavement of Native 
Americans and Africans), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Bryan v. 
Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 202 (1853) (“The blacks were introduced into” white Christian 
communities “as a race of Pagan slaves.”), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; 
Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806) (referring to an 1682 
Virginia law providing that “all servants brought into this country . . . not being 
Christians, whether negroes, Moors, mulattoes, or Indians . . . and all Indians . . . 
sold by neighbouring Indians . . . as slaves, should be slaves to all intents and 
purposes”), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
249. E.g., Pirate v. Dalby, 1 Dall. 167, 168 (Pa. 1786) (noting that “[s]lavery 
is of a very ancient origin,” referring to descriptions in the Bible and to the practices 
of Greeks, Romans, and Germans), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also
Bryan, 14 Ga. at 203-04 (referring to Roman law to support the conclusion that a 
freed slave did not enjoy all the rights and benefits of citizenship). 
250. E.g., Pirate, 1 Dall. at 168 (“By the sacred books of Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy, [slavery] appears to have existed in the first ages of the world.”), 
abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; JOHN PATRICK DALY, WHEN SLAVERY WAS 
CALLED FREEDOM: EVANGELICALISM, PROSLAVERY, AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 32, 35-37, 60-67, 85, 92-93, 100 (2002). One popular religious defense of 
slavery was simply that an all-powerful God had permitted it to persist: “God had 
clearly not destroyed the system, so if it was a violation of His Kingdom on earth, 
abolitionists were accusing God of incompetence or of complicity in sin.” Id. at 92; 
see also id. at 35 (referring to the belief that “God was frustrating the anti-slavery 
movement at every turn while blessing the kingdom of cotton and evangelicalism, 
which was spreading across the land with an ease that had to be divinely inspired”).
251. State v. Belmont, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 445, 451-52 (S.C. Ct. App. 1847) 
(quoting Matthew Estes, A DEFENSE OF NEGRO SLAVERY, AS IT EXISTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1846), and recommending it as “a book destined to enlighten the 
public mind”), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Pirate, 1 Dall. at 
168-69 (determining that the slave status of the illegitimate son of a slave mother 
and a free man is “strongly authorized by the civil law, from which this sort of 
domestic slavery is derived, and is in itself . . . consistent with the precepts of 
nature”); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 258-59 (1859) (stating that African 
slavery “is in no wise opposed to the law of nature as it exists here,” and citing to an 
author whose work was “distinguished alike for ability, research, and a clear and 
lucid perception”), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Scott v. Sanford 
(Dread Scott Case), 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 407-23 (1856) (noting that the American 
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was acknowledged in the Constitution252 and constituted an 
“excepted case” from the “great principles of natural right asserted in 
the Declaration of Independence.”253
In 1865, at the conclusion of the Civil War, our country finally 
broke with its tradition of slavery through adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.254 In 1866, Congress enacted legislation intended to 
advance the economic integration of newly freed slaves by, among 
other things, prohibiting racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcement of contracts: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, 
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the 
United States, to make and enforce contracts . . . .255
                                                                                                               
colonies viewed Africans as inferior beings doomed to slavery and reduced to 
merchandise), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; JOHN STUART MILL, THE 
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 12-13 (Susan Moller Okin ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 
1988) (1869) (referring to the view both in antiquity and in American slavery, that 
the dominion of a class of masters over a class of slaves was “natural”).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1787), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1) (apportioning Representatives and taxes by “adding to the whole Number 
of free Persons . . . three fifths of all other Persons”); Dred Scott Case, 60 U.S. at 
403-04 (holding that descendants of slaves are not citizens under the U.S. 
Constitution, but were considered at the time of adoption “as a subordinate and 
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race”); see also 
Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 257 (“[B]y the common consent of all the States, at the 
adoption of our Constitution, the negro race was excluded from association and 
political equality with the whites, as an inferior class . . . .”).
253. State v. Hoppess, 1 Ohio 105, 110 (1845) (referring ruefully to a 
“matter of compromise as to an existing and admitted evil, necessary to the 
formation of the union”).
254. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
255. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The first clause of the 
quoted text recognized the citizenship of all those born in the U.S., thus overruling 
the Dred Scott decision. Dred Scott Case, 60 U.S. at 403-04 (1856); see also supra
notes 251-52 and accompanying text. Two years later, that important provision was 
echoed in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The language 
guaranteeing equal rights in contracting was reenacted in § 16 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, to permit the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment to 
act as constitutional support for the legislation, in tandem with the Thirteenth 
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In 1870, adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
implementing legislation, guaranteed the right to vote without 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”256 Although the struggle to perfect and implement these 
civil rights has continued well more than a century after 
Reconstruction,257 the Thirteenth Amendment represented an end to 
the legally sanctioned evil of slavery.258
                                                                                                               
Amendment. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 
& n.17 (1982). After the 1874 recodification, the provision of equal rights to make 
and enforce contracts appeared in § 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1874). After falling into disuse, § 1981 was revived when the 
U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that it reached private discrimination in contracting. 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-74 (1976) (relying on Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-21 (1968), which had held similarly for a companion 
statute). In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, Congress divided § 1981 
into three subsections, adding (1) a provision that codified the Supreme Court’s 
holding that § 1981 reaches private discrimination as well as discrimination under 
the color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c), and (2) a provision that overruled 
another Supreme Court decision by defining the existing statutory language “make 
and enforce contracts” to include all benefits of the contractual relationship, 
including the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981(b) (superseding Patterson v. McClean, 491 U.S. 164, 175-85 (1989), which 
had held that “make and enforce” contracts did not reach discrimination in the 
performance of a contract). 
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Civil Rights Act of 1870 (The Enforcement 
Act), 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 
257. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3-70 (4th ed. 1996) (observing that, for a century, Reconstruction-era 
civil rights legislation and constitutional amendments were largely ineffective tools 
for vindication of civil rights due to restrictive judicial interpretations); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1387-1410 (2015) (tracing efforts to 
suppress the Black vote throughout much of the twentieth century, but concluding 
that partisan efforts at restricting the vote are not as clearly tied to race in the 
twenty-first century); Cody Ross, The United States Police-Shooting Database: A 
Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at the County-
Level in the United States, 2011-2014, at 5 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534673 
(“[O]n average across counties in the United States,” an unarmed-black individual is 
as likely to be shot by police as an armed-white individual); U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 62-
78 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/ 
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (finding unlawful 
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But in the same era, women were treated as persons with less 
than full legal status and agency. States could and did deny women 
the right to vote, a state of affairs that persisted until well into the 
twentieth century, when the Nineteenth Amendment prohibited sex 
discrimination in voting.259 In 1874, just four years after adoption of 
the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld states’ rights to 
deny the vote to women, citing to “uniform practice long 
continued,”260 noting that “[w]omen were excluded from suffrage in 
nearly all the States by the express provision of their constitutions 
and laws,”261 and adding that “[n]o new State has ever been admitted 
to the Union which has conferred the right of suffrage upon 
women.”262
True, women had always been accorded citizenship,263 which 
had been denied to the descendants of slaves prior to the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.264 Their brand of 
citizenship, however, was decidedly second-class in the nineteenth 
century. Aside from the denial of voting rights, the laws of many 
states formally denied to women the economic opportunities that the 
post-Civil War amendments and legislation sought to accord to male 
former slaves.265 Justice Bradley’s now jarring explanation of “the 
                                                                                                               
discriminatory intent and disparate impact in policing practices affecting the 
African-American community). 
258. See supra note 254. 
259. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
260. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (18 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). 
261. Id. at 176. 
262. Id. at 177. 
263. Id. at 165-70. 
264. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. 
265. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 
(Mass. 2003) (“The common law was exceptionally harsh toward women who 
became wives: a woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into that of her husband,” 
and the relationship of a wife to husband was viewed as similar to that of slave to 
master.); Latta v. Otter 771 F.3d 456, 475 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing legal 
disabilities imposed on married women in the nineteenth century, and later 
abandonment of them, to reject argument that same-sex marriage bans should be 
upheld to protect the tradition of opposite-sex marriage); id. at 487-89 (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (tracing these legal disabilities, as well as their repeal and replacement 
in the twentieth century); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 958-59, 
992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing principles of coverture and sharply defined 
gender roles in marriage, but noting “[t]hat time has passed”) aff’d sub nom. Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (no standing to appeal); Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel.
Cty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 410, 458 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (citing to nineteenth 
century case law), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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civil law, as well as nature herself,”266 appeared in his concurrence to 
a Supreme Court decision in 1872 upholding a state law barring 
women from the practice of law.267 As Justice Bradley explained, this 
restriction was related to a married woman’s more general surrender 
of legal status and agency:  
The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or 
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the 
common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a 
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was 
regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and, 
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the 
special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal 
principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a 
married woman is incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making 
contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was 
one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important 
in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and 
trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor.268
The Court’s decision, and especially Justice Bradley’s
concurrence, must have felt like a direct rebuke to women activists 
who had gathered at Seneca Falls in 1848 to demand their civil 
rights, and who stated in part: 
Resolved, That all laws which prevent woman from occupying such a 
station in society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a 
position inferior to that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, 
and therefore of no force or authority. 
Resolved, That woman is man’s equal - was intended to be so by the 
Creator, and the highest good of the race demands that she should be 
recognized as such.269
                                                     
266. Supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
267. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., 
concurring), abrogated by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) 
(finding that municipal regulations that categorically required female teachers to 
take maternity leave several months prior to expected birth, without individualized 
assessment of ability to work, were not rationally related to legitimate state interest 
and thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
268. Id. at 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
269. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS [hereinafter DECLARATION], reprinted in
2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 68, 72 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony 
& Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., Source Book Press 1970) (1881) [hereinafter
SUFFRAGE] (quoting the second and third resolutions of the Declaration). 
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Nineteenth century racial and sexual stereotypes likely 
provided similar justifications for subordination on the basis of both 
race and sex.270 Prominent advocates for women’s civil rights in 
decades after the Civil War, while noting some progress during that 
time, characterized the condition of women as a form of slavery.271 In 
short, in the Reconstruction Era, federal law protected newly freed 
slaves from racial discrimination, but it did nothing to protect 
women—whether former slaves or members of high society—from 
sex discrimination.272
One might then ask how laws restricting women’s autonomy 
could persist in the era of abolition of slavery and related landmark 
constitutional and statutory protections accorded to newly freed 
slaves. One answer is that discrimination on the basis of race and sex 
both persisted at an elevated level because the post-Civil War civil 
rights laws were interpreted in a restrictive manner and largely lay 
dormant until revived in the twentieth century.273 Moreover, the legal 
and social status of women likely reflected a paternalistic view, 
promoted by men, that the legal state of affairs benefitted both 
sexes,274 just as some had perversely argued that slavery was 
beneficial to the slaves.275
                                                     
270. For example, according to one scholar of the era: 
[A prominent Reverend’s statement that slaves’ capacity for religious 
love] was little different from similar statements about women’s religious 
propensity and moral elevation used to perpetuate subordination. . . . This 
standard extended beyond the church walls to canonize slaves’ and 
women’s social roles, whereas it was not deemed appropriate to Christian 
manliness or the force of character men were expected to display in their 
social roles. A proslavery pamphlet by a Presbyterian minister’s son 
recorded that “it is not degrading for a slave to submit to a blow—neither 
is it to a priest or woman.” 
DALY, supra note 250, at 88.  
271. SUFFRAGE, supra note 269, at 13-14; MILL, supra note 251, at 4-17
(characterizing the subjugation of women in the nineteenth century as a mitigated 
form of slavery, maintained through law, education, and force stemming from the 
superior strength of their husbands, and justified by the purportedly different natures 
of the sexes). 
272. Although the Supreme Court would eventually apply mid-level 
heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications challenged under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it did not do so until a century after Reconstruction. See, e.g., Wendy 
W. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause: 1970–80, 25 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 41-43 (2013) (summarizing litigation in the 1970’s that 
elevated the level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications above the lowest tier). 
273. See EISENBERG, supra note 257, at 70. 
274. Justice Bradley, for example, sought to justify the legal restrictions on a 
woman’s economic autonomy by referring to her assigned role of wife and mother 
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But one might still strive to explain the juxtaposition of the 
flurry of congressional activity to protect the economic and voting 
rights of newly freed slaves while state law still denied women the 
right to vote and denied economic agency to married women. 
To support a point about a fallacy in civil rights opposition that 
likely is repeated through history, this author suggests a simple 
answer: sex is “different.” Sex and sexual roles implicated issues 
relating to procreation, child-rearing, and a learned or instinctual 
need of men to view themselves as the smarter, stronger sex, 
                                                                                                               
as “noble and benign,” and by recognizing a man’s obligation to serve as “woman’s 
protector and defender” in light of her “natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); 
SUFFRAGE, supra note 269, at 13 (“Another writer asserts that the tyranny of man 
over woman has its roots, after all, in his nobler feelings; his love, his chivalry, and 
his desire to protect woman . . . . But wherever the roots may be traced, the results at 
this hour are equally disastrous to woman.”); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412, 421-22 (1908) (upholding restriction on women’s occupations partly to protect 
them in the name of true equality), abrogated by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (finding that municipal regulations that categorically 
required female teachers to take maternity leave several months prior to expected 
birth, without individualized assessment of ability to work, was not rationally related 
to legitimate state interest and thus violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); DECLARATION, supra note 269, at 72 (noting that man “does accord to 
woman moral superiority” while he claims intellectual superiority). 
275. A particularly strong and racially charged statement to this effect 
appears in a nineteenth century judicial opinion, which quotes from a book of Dr. 
Matthew Estes, which the court lauds as “a book destined to enlighten the public 
mind”:
All history assures us that the negro race thrive in health, multiply greatly, 
become civilized and religious, feel no degradation, and are happy, when 
in subjection to the white race. Estes says, “they feel and acknowledge 
their inferiority; and in consequence slavery is not in the least regarded as 
a degradation, but as their proper and natural position.” . . . “I do not 
believe,” he continues, “conscientiously, that one slave in ten could be 
induced to accept the offer of freedom if accompanied with the condition 
that they were to leave the United States. This has been attested again and 
again.”
State v. Belmont, 35 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 445, 451-52 (S.C. Ct. App. 1847) (quoting 
Matthew Estes, A DEFENSE OF NEGRO SLAVERY, AS IT EXISTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1846), in attempting to explain laws that distinguished between Native Americans 
and Africans in slaveholding). Some proslavery evangelical writers argued curiously 
that slavery saved slaves from homelessness, provided “providential guardians” in 
slaveholders, who saved slaves from extinction through their own improvidence, and 
elevated slaves’ character, primarily through church attendance. DALY, supra note 
250, at 80, 85-87. But cf. id. at 35-36, 40, 52, 85 (explaining that relatively few 
southerners sought to justify slavery in such positive terms and were content to 
argue in the negative that slavery was evil primarily in individual cases of abusive 
slaveholders).  
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uniquely capable of democratic self-governance and performance of 
the role of family breadwinner. And, even as one civil rights 
movement succeeded, our society had a great capacity to see the next 
cause as different, as distinguishable, as justifying renewed 
resistance.276
What else can explain the persisting opposition to interracial 
marriage in the early 1960s, several years after Brown v. Board of 
Education277 ruled that racial segregation in public schools violated 
the Constitution, more than four decades after women gained the 
right to vote, and at the same time that the 1964 Civil Rights Act,278
among other things, prohibited employment discrimination based on 
race or sex?279 In the years prior to Loving v. Virginia,280 while 
several states still banned interracial marriage, national public 
opinion polls revealed that the vast majority of Americans 
disapproved of interracial marriages,281 and a majority even 
supported laws that banned such marriages.282
As noted by Richard Delgado: 
[I]f whites and nonwhites cannot marry and make lives together, what 
does it matter if they can attend the same movie theater or swim in the 
same public pool? The prohibition of intermarriage would seem to violate 
Brown’s mandate as glaringly as any other.283
But, again, in the eyes of those defending the bans, interracial 
marriage was different from previous civil rights issues. It triggered 
                                                     
276. One 1915 political ad in Massachusetts warned that women’s suffrage 
was supported by “ENEMIES OF THE HOME AND OF CHRISTIAN 
CIVILIZATION,” and would increase taxes, encourage divorce, and threaten “the 
Family as the Unit of the State.” Political Advertisement, BOS. J. (Oct. 30, 1915), 
http://vintage-ads.livejournal.com/2405721.html.  
277. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
278. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (1964). 
279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
280. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
281. When asked in a 1958 Gallup poll whether those polled approved of 
marriage “[b]etween white and colored people,” only 4% expressed approval. 
GALLUP NEWS SERV., GALLUP POLL SOCIAL SERIES: MINORITY RIGHTS & RELATIONS
3-4, http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/163703/Interracial_marriage_130725.pdf. Even 
after the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving, a 1968 Gallup poll asking about 
personal approval or disapproval of marriage “[b]etween whites and non-whites” 
revealed only 20% approval and 73% disapproval. Id.  
282. According to a poll conducted by the National Opinion Research 
Center, 53% of Americans favored “laws against marriages between Negroes and 
whites” in 1964, three years before Loving v. Virginia. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: 
Interracial Socializing, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 283, 291 (1973). 
283. Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525, 525 (2012). 
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new fears and sensitivities about race coupled with sexual 
relations,284 procreation,285 and child-rearing.286 Echoing previous 
forms of discrimination, some viewed interracial marriage as 
unnatural and inconsistent with religious doctrine287 and with long-
standing tradition.288
                                                     
284. Some anti-miscegenation statutes, for example, criminalized interracial 
sexual cohabitation, regardless of marriage. E.g., 1927 No. 214, 1927-214 Ala. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. 219 (LexisNexis) (amending § 5001 of the Code of 1923) (providing 
for imprisonment of two to seven years if “any white person [or] any negro . . . 
intermarry, or live in adultery or fornication with each other.”), abrogated by Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Of course, interracial sexual relations were 
widespread during slavery, although largely in the form of a slaveholder’s inherently 
coercive use and abuse of his “property.” See DALY, supra note 250, at 80 1, 4-5, 8, 
91 (southerners often admitted to charges of sexual abuse in slavery but simply 
“pointed to northern urban prostitution as a similar failing”). American society faced 
a new challenge when contemplating the open and voluntary decision of an 
interracial couple to marry and become loving, committed sexual partners, and 
otherwise “mak[ing] lives together,” as Delgado puts it. Delgado, supra note 283, at 
525. 
285. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (in upholding 
state regulation of marriage to avoid “a mongrel breed of citizens,” the court found 
“no requirement that the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial 
pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the 
quality of its citizenship.”), abrogated by Loving, 388 U.S. 1. Some nineteenth 
century case law speaks of mixed race offspring with even greater disdain. E.g., 
Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869) (“The amalgamation of the races is . . . always 
productive of deplorable results. . . . [T]he offspring of these unnatural connections 
are generally sickly and effeminate, and . . . they are inferior in physical 
development and strength, to the full-blood of either race.”), abrogated by Loving,
388 U.S. 1; Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 311 (1871) (viewing “any effort to 
intermerge the individuality of the races as a calamity full of the saddest and 
gloomiest portent to the generations that are to come after us,” while purporting to 
protect civil rights guaranteed by the recent constitutional amendments), abrogated 
by Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Greg Johnson, We’ve Heard This Before: The Legacy of 
Interracial Marriage Bans and the Implications for Today’s Marriage Equality 
Debates, 34 VT. L. REV. 277, 281-82 (2009) (collecting cases and quotations 
regarding procreation and its effect on racial integrity).
286. In Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948), the County Clerk 
defended the state ban on interracial marriage partly by arguing that “the progeny of 
a marriage between a Negro and a Caucasian suffer not only the stigma of such 
inferiority but the fear of rejection by members of both races.” The Court responded: 
“If they do, the fault lies not with their parents, but with the prejudices in the 
community and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices by giving legal force to the 
belief that certain races are inferior.” Id.
287. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (“[T]he Virginia 
courts declared that interracial marriage simply could not exist because the Deity 
had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural[.]”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (“Alarms about the imminent erosion of 
the ‘natural’ order of marriage were sounded over the demise of anti-miscegenation 
Advocacy for Marriage Equality 1301 
Those objections to interracial marriage have so faded that the 
approval rate for interracial marriage rose from 4% in 1958 to 87% 
in 2013,289 and stood in 2013 at 96% for those 18 to 29 years of 
age.290 Today, objections to interracial marriage on the basis of 
nature, scripture, or tradition would sound as jarring to most ears as 
do Justice Bradley’s appeals to God and nature to justify a state law 
banning women from the practice of law or similar rationales for 
slavery.291
And—while writing this passage one week after our oldest son 
joyfully entered into a same-sex marriage with his partner of seven 
years—I predict that similar objections to same-sex marriage will 
sound equally jarring a few decades from now. Yet, insufficient or 
improper motivations such as religious objections or simple animus 
sometimes surfaced as explicit justifications for same-sex marriage 
bans,292 or can be inferred from the unusual nature of a regulation293
or the implausibility of the justifications advanced for it.294
                                                                                                               
laws; Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 752 (“[T]he natural law which forbids their intermarriage 
and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine 
as that which imparted to them different natures.” (quoting State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 
389, 404 (1871)); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. (1 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878) 
(“[T]hey should be kept distinct and separate, and . . . connections and alliances so 
unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive 
law[.]”); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(referring to “religious arguments that were mobilized in the 1950s to argue against 
interracial marriage and integration as against God’s will”), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (no standing to appeal). 
288. As explained by Judge Posner: 
[T]he limitation of marriage to persons of the same race was traditional in 
a number of states when the Supreme Court invalidated it [in Loving in 
1967]. Laws forbidding black-white marriage dated back to colonial times 
and were found in northern as well as southern colonies and states.  
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir.) (citing PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 20 
(2009)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
289. GALLUP, supra note 281 and accompanying text (2013 poll asked about 
approval or disapproval of “marriage between Blacks and Whites”).
290. Id. (third chart, listing approval “by Subgroup”).
291. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (“Race restrictions on marital 
partners were once common in most states but are now seen as archaic, shameful or 
even bizarre.”).
292. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) 
(referring to the Book of Genesis in emphasizing the longstanding view of marriage 
as a heterosexual institution advancing procreation), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); ex parte State ex 
rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *7 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) 
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Moreover, in conversations over the years with friends, 
colleagues, and former students, when this author compared the 
same-sex marriage movement with the fight for interracial marriage 
and voiced his prediction about eventual acceptance of same-sex 
                                                                                                               
(citing to nineteenth century case law, which in turn quotes a nineteenth century 
contracts treatise, for the proposition that marriage is “founded on the will of God.”), 
abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 945, 955-56, 
985-86 (reviewing evidence that religious arguments were advanced to support 
Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriage); Pareto v. Ruvin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly 
Supp. 899, 904 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 2014) (noting that amici curiae associate same-sex 
marriage with the spread of HIV/AIDS); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
968, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (recounting fear-mongering in campaign for 
constitutional amendment banning recognition of same-sex marriage) rev’d sub 
nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Huntsman v. Heavilin, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 916, 
918 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014) (finding animus when “[t]he Amici Curiae’s memorandum 
paints a picture of homosexuals as HIV infected, alcohol and drug abusers, who are 
promiscuous and psychologically . . . incapable of long term relationships or . . . 
raising children”); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1013-18, 1042 (Wash. 
2006) (en banc) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (legislative history shows that ban on same-
sex marriage reflected sectarian religious views, and animosity rooted in religious 
and moral objection), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. But cf. DeBoer, 772 
F.3d at 388, 408-09 (stating its unwillingness to infer the intentions of voters, and 
thus having insufficient basis to find animus), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
2584. 
293. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding that state 
constitutional amendment banning state and local laws protecting gay rights was “so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class it affects”); United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage . . . is strong evidence of a 
law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.”); cf. Bishop v. 
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1100-04 (10th Cir.), (Holmes, J., concurring), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (explaining that unusual structure of a regulation can suggest 
animus, but explaining why court found no such basis for animus in this case). 
294. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir.) (finding that 
Indiana’s recognition of out-of-state marriages between fertile cousins, though 
banned in Indiana, coupled with its failure to recognize out-of-state same-sex 
marriages, and its “inability to make a plausible argument” for the latter ban, 
“suggests animus against same-sex marriage[s]”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 
(2014); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d. at 1002-03 (finding that post-hoc justifications for 
Proposition 8 are such poor fits as to be irrational, supporting inference that this 
referendum banning same-sex marriage was motivated by the view that opposite-sex 
couples are superior to same-sex couples); Latta v. Otter 771 F.3d 456, 495-96 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (observing that sexual orientation discrimination 
in employment, housing, and participation on juries is primarily motivated by 
stereotypes, animus, and distaste); cf. Johnson, supra note 285, at 284 (“[T]he 
debate about same-sex marriage is more about sexual orientation than it is about 
marriage. The debate is, in short, a referendum on homosexuality and gay rights.”).
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marriage, those who disagreed did so on familiar grounds: on 
religious convictions,295 on the basis of what seemed “natural” to 
them,296 and on the belief that the issue of same-sex marriage is 
“different” from earlier issues such as interracial marriage.297
Of course it’s different. Each new civil rights claim is different 
from the last; otherwise, it would already be assimilated into the 
culture and would not meet resistance from the majority in society. 
But, it is revealing that our society seems to repeat the patterns of 
resistance that are ultimately rejected in each new step forward.  
And meritorious civil rights claims need not be equivalent on 
some moral scale. For example, banning interracial marriage is 
undoubtedly less horrible than buying, selling, and holding human 
beings for slave labor, but they are both terribly wrong. Our nation 
need not weigh marriage equality against other civil rights claims to 
know that the law should not prohibit loving and committed 
consenting adults from sharing their lives together with dignity and 
legal rights. As stated by Greg Johnson, “It is not necessary to claim 
that homophobia is as bad as racism, or that [the] lesbian and gay[] 
[population ha[s] been discriminated against in the same ways as 
have people of color, to make the legal comparison between the two 
movements for marriage equality.”298
It may be that unnecessary difficulty was introduced to the 
same-sex marriage debate because our society has used the same 
word, “marriage,” for both a church-sanctioned religious marriage 
and the issuance of a state license to wed with the consequent legal 
rights and responsibilities. If these two ceremonies are conflated, 
religious objections to marriage equality can migrate from the church 
to the state.299 Of course, equality in the issuance of a state license 
                                                     
295. See also Johnson, supra note 285, at 281 (“Religious arguments against 
same-sex marriage have fallen out of favor in the courts, but they are still an 
important part of the popular discourse.”).
296. See also Latta, 771 F.3d at 486 (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting that 
state officials defending state marriage ban argued that the ban communicates that 
state’s view about what is “normal,” and thus reinforces the state’s view about the 
“natural[]” sex roles in a marriage and parenting).
297. Indeed, as explained by Greg Johnson, “Gay rights advocates are split 
on the merits of the comparison [between interracial marriage and same-sex 
marriage bans]. Some fear the ‘sameness’ argument risks contributing to injustice 
and alienating potential supporters in the African-American community by ignoring 
the differences between the two civil rights struggles.” Johnson, supra note 285, at 
278-79 (citing to other commentators). 
298. Id. at 287. 
299. See, e.g., ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 
892752, at *7 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) (citing to nineteenth century case law, which in 
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will leave unimpeded an organized religion’s freedom under the First 
Amendment to limit church-sanctioned religious unions as dictated 
by the tenets of the religion.300 However, one wonders whether the 
issue of equality in the issuance of state licenses to wed might have 
been less contentious if it had always been known by a different 
name, for opposite-sex as well as same-sex couples.
The question arises whether civil rights advocates can advance 
a meritorious civil rights claim, such as that for same-sex marriage, 
by explicitly addressing our society’s tendency to repeat the mistakes 
of the past, often with strikingly similar justifications. Would explicit 
presentation of a broad historical view, coupled with a judicial desire 
to avoid playing the role of Justice Bradley to future generations,301
help courts to recognize minority rights at an earlier stage in the 
national debate? One wonders, for example, whether a broad 
historical view might have spurred lower courts to have more 
quickly recognized the undermining of Baker v. Nelson302 and the 
constitutional infirmities of bans on same-sex marriage, perhaps 
acting after Romer or Lawrence rather than waiting for the cue of 
Windsor.303
B. Judicial Incrementalism 
Civil rights’ rapid progress in the courts is moderated by at 
least two forces, often interrelated: (1) the role of courts to narrowly 
                                                                                                               
turn quotes a nineteenth century contracts treatise, for the proposition that marriage, 
generally, is “founded on the will of God”), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
300. E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1227 (10th Cir.) (“[R]eligious 
institutions remain as free as they always have been to practice their sacraments and 
traditions as they see fit.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
301. See supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Bradley 
in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S., 130 (1872)). 
302. See supra notes 25-28, 34-39 and accompanying text.  
303. Indeed, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Marsha Berzon believes that 
Baker was undermined as early as 1976, when the Supreme Court clarified, a 
“fundamental doctrinal change,” that sex-based classifications warrant intermediate 
scrutiny. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 485 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) 
(citing to Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
218-21 (1976), in which Justice Rehnquist characterized the majority’s level of 
scrutiny as elevated above rational basis scrutiny although not to the level of strict 
scrutiny). Judge Berzon’s view about this early undermining of Baker is premised 
on her conclusion that at least some same-sex marriage bans classify on the basis of 
sex, even more so than on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 495-96.  
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decide only the cases before them, rather than broadly legislate,304
and (2) judicial hesitance to wade in too quickly when a contentious 
issue is the subject of democratic deliberation in other forums.305
1. Resolving Only the Dispute before the Court 
The first factor implicates our doctrine of stare decisis, which 
limits the precedential effect of a decision to its holding, as defined 
by the facts and reasoning that support the decision.306 Courts honor 
this limitation by restricting their decisions to the disputes before 
them,307 sometimes accompanied by supplementary dictum designed 
to illustrate the breadth or narrowness of the holding.308 Conversely, a 
court strays from the premises underlying a conventional view of 
stare decisis when it reaches well beyond the dispute before it, and 
attempts to resolve a broader array of controversies with dicta that is 
                                                     
304. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1999) (stating that judicial minimalism 
means, in part, “that courts should not decide issues unnecessary to the resolution of 
a case”); id. at 10 (explaining that judicial minimalists “decide the case at hand; they 
do not decide other cases too, except to the extent that one decision necessarily bears 
on other cases, and unless they are pretty much forced to do so”). 
305. See id. at 5-6, 24-26; supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text. 
306. See, e.g., King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1985) (determining 
that statements about judges in courts of limited jurisdiction were nonbinding dicta 
when appearing in Supreme Court precedent about immunity of judges in courts 
with general jurisdiction); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 
1980) (adopting and adhering to a narrow interpretation of the holding of a previous 
decision of the court); SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 4-5 (judicial minimalism means, 
in part, “that courts should follow prior holdings but not necessarily prior dicta”); 
see also id. at 19-20 (discussing holding, dicta, and stare decisis). 
307. See supra note 304. 
308. As this author has explained in a textbook: 
“Dictum”. . . is a statement in the opinion that helps explain the court’s 
reasoning by addressing questions not squarely presented in the dispute 
before the court. . . . As a means of explaining the reasons supporting its 
holding, a court may in dicta compare its rule of decision with other rules 
that it does not apply to the dispute, or it may discuss in dicta how its rule 
of decision would apply to facts other than those presented in the dispute 
before it. 
CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 130 (7th ed. 2014). A good 
example is presented by Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
which held that male on female unwelcome sexual advances constituted a form of 
sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court explained 
its analysis partly in an often cited footnote, which stated in dicta that the result 
would be the same for female on male harassment, or same-sex harassment of either 
gender, but not for purely bisexual harassment that applied equally to male and 
female subordinates. Id. at 990 n.55.  
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unnecessary to explain the current holding.309 As explained by Cass 
Sunstein: 
A court may well blunder if it tries, for example, to resolve the question of 
affirmative action once and for all, or to issue definitive rulings about the 
role of the First Amendment in an area of new communications 
technologies. A court that decides relatively little will also reduce the risks 
that come from intervening in complex systems, where a single-shot 
intervention can have a range of unanticipated bad consequences.310
In its decisions on the road to Obergefell, paving the way to 
same-sex marriage rights, the Supreme Court has appeared to adhere 
to the model of limiting each decision to the dispute before it.311 It 
resolved equal access to the political process in Romer, established 
the right to private consensual homosexual intimacy in Lawrence,
and accorded federal recognition to lawful same-sex marriages in 
Windsor,312 each time refraining from opining directly on the 
constitutionality of state bans on same-sex marriage.313 Indeed, in 
                                                     
309. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 20-21 (describing “the ordinary 
picture of Anglo-American common law”); id. at 36-39 (discussing Dred Scott and 
Roe v. Wade as maximalist decisions, and Brown v. Board of Education as less 
maximalist than it might appear); id. at 48 (“[M]inimalism might make special sense 
in view of the pervasive possibility of changed circumstances.”); Delgado, supra
note 283, at 526 (stating the view of judicial incrementalists that Roe v. Wade was a 
“sweeping decision” that intervened when “public discussion of abortion was not 
complete”); Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Offers Critique of Roe 
v. Wade During Law School Visit, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offers-critique-roe-
v-wade-during-law-school-visit (observing that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a 
strong champion of women’s rights, critiqued Roe v. Wade as too far-reaching and 
sweeping, providing an easy target for opponents). 
310. SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 4. 
311. See generally id. at 47 (opining that the Court’s deciding Romer in 
minimalist fashion, without even mentioning Bowers v. Hardwick, is likely the 
product of the difficulty of securing agreement on broader principles within a 
diverse court). 
312. See supra notes 52-130 and accompanying text. 
313. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 150-52 (explaining that, 
although Romer intervened during democratic deliberation, it was sufficiently 
“subminimalist” that it failed to even mention Bowers v. Hardwick, which seemed to 
be inconsistent with Romer’s premises); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 
(2003) (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”); 
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 466 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lawrence and 
Windsor as leaving this question open); supra note 123 (noting that Windsor
expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of state bans on same-sex 
marriage, although dissent feared that the majority’s reasoning would extend to 
same-sex marriage rights).  
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reviewing the successful challenge to California’s ban on same-sex 
marriage through Proposition 8, the Supreme Court avoided the 
merits altogether by finding that the Court of Appeals should have 
dismissed for lack of standing to appeal.314 This brand of 
incrementalism appears to have allowed the law to develop with 
appropriate care and deliberation, culminating in marriage equality, a 
civil rights milestone in the United States.  
A related factor may affect the precedential effect of a decision, 
even when a court formally resolves only the dispute before it. A 
court may resolve that dispute through the application of one or more 
legal principles, which may vary in the degree to which they might 
naturally extend to other kinds of cases.  
In Lawrence, for example, Justice O’Connor concurred with 
the majority’s judgment but argued that the case could have been 
decided more narrowly on equal protection grounds, which would 
have allowed the Court to distinguish Bowers v. Hardwick and avoid 
a more far-reaching rationale based on due process.315 Similarly, in 
Windsor, the majority opinion explicitly declined to rely solely on 
federalism principles to strike down the federal DOMA, and rested 
the decision as well on other rationales316 that could later be extended 
to scrutinize state bans on same-sex marriage.317 The multiple legal 
rationales in Windsor prompted an expression of hope from Justice 
Scalia that lower courts would seize on the federalism rationale, but 
also an accurate prediction from him that courts would invoke the 
alternative rationales to strike down same-sex marriages bans.318
This author finds it difficult to criticize a court for applying any 
legal rationale, or combination of rationales, that thoroughly explains 
the Court’s resolution of that dispute, rather than resting solely on 
the narrowest possible legal rationale, one that would advance the 
law to the least degree. If a court chooses a legal rationale that can be 
extended by analogy to other disputes in future cases, it is fulfilling 
its institutional function of developing the law in a clear and orderly 
fashion,319 while allowing the extensions to take place incrementally, 
                                                     
314. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
315. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra notes 84, 85 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia had earlier 
opined that the majority opinion in Lawrence logically led to recognition of a right 
to same-sex marriage. Supra note 80. 
319. See, e.g., Shirley M. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: 
Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971); Charles Alan 
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as the new disputes make their way through the courts. True, courts 
frequently prefer to avoid a constitutional issue if they can resolve a 
dispute on a statutory basis,320 and they frequently avoid ruling on a 
novel constitutional question if they can resolve the dispute through 
application of a more settled constitutional standard.321 However, 
stare decisis and judicial moderation do not require such restrained 
reasoning that the law remains mired in a sea of mud that barely 
creeps forward. 
For example, in Saucier v. Katz,322 the Supreme Court 
mandated that federal courts resolve underlying constitutional issues 
in civil rights litigation prior to addressing official immunity from 
damages, so that courts would continue to develop the body of 
constitutional law, even in cases in which they could have dismissed 
solely on the narrow ground of official immunity.323 In Pearson v. 
Callahan,324 the Court retreated from the mandatory character of this 
rule, once again permitting lower courts the flexibility to avoid the 
constitutional question in appropriate cases.325 Pearson noted, 
however, that Saucier’s protocol “is often beneficial,” and that “the 
Saucier Court was certainly correct in noting that the two-step 
procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent.”326
In sum, an appellate court’s choosing or developing a rationale 
with a solid legal grounding should be viewed as a perfectly 
appropriate legal method for resolving and explaining the decision 
and advancing the law, even though the court did not limit its 
reasoning to the narrowest possible basis for its decision. Choosing a 
rationale that arguably applies equally or nearly as well to other 
                                                                                                               
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779 
(1957). 
320. SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 4 (stating that judicial minimalism means, 
in part, “that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions”). This approach 
was famously articulated by Justice Brandeis in a concurring opinion in Ashwander 
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
321. See, e.g., supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining that some 
courts have applied rational basis test to strike down same-sex marriage bans, 
because application of heightened scrutiny in that context was not firmly 
established); SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 146-48 (discussing a trio of cases that 
found equal protection violations, partly on the basis of illegitimate legislative 
animus toward targeted groups, while avoiding ruling on arguments that the 
classifications should trigger heightened scrutiny).  
322. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
323. Id. at 200-01. 
324. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
325. Id. at 236. 
326. Saucier, 555 U.S. at 236.  
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classes of disputes sends helpful guidance to lower courts without 
actually deciding those other disputes prematurely.  
2. Deferring to Democratic Deliberation 
The second moderating force on judicial advances in 
constitutional civil rights applies with greatest force when an issue is 
the topic of public debate and is under consideration for regulation in 
another branch of government, raising concerns about separation of 
powers.327 This factor divided many state and lower federal courts,328
and it spurred the sharpest division between the majority and 
dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Obergefell.329 Indeed, in 
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts predicted that the Supreme Court’s
intervention would prolong the controversy: “Stealing this issue from 
the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, 
making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to 
accept.”330
Similarly, in his majority opinion for the Sixth Circuit, Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton argued that judicial deference could eventually lead to 
a more satisfying consensus in favor of minority rights: 
When the courts do not let the people resolve new social issues like this 
one, they perpetuate the idea that the heroes in these change events are 
judges and lawyers. Better in this instance, we think, to allow change 
through the customary political processes, in which the people, gay and 
straight alike, become the heroes of their own stories by meeting each 
other not as adversaries in a court system but as fellow citizens seeking to 
resolve a new social issue in a fair-minded way.331
But the confidence of Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Sutton 
in political processes places an unfair burden on the minority group 
to effect change. Dissenting from Judge Sutton’s majority opinion, 
Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey observed that “these plaintiffs are not 
political zealots trying to push reform on their fellow citizens; they 
                                                     
327. Goodridge v. Dep ‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 991 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting) (referring to “the strongly worded principles of separation of 
powers” in the state constitution).
328. See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text. 
329. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text. 
330. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). 
331. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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are committed same-sex couples, many of them heading up de facto 
families, who want to achieve equal status.”332
Moreover, deference to democratic processes controlled by 
majority sentiments can extend the deprivation of civil rights for 
many years, to the detriment of the affected minority group and 
ultimately to the detriment of society as a whole.333 Particularly if 
state constitutional amendments during a period of backlash have 
erected an impediment to democratic deliberation and correction,334
many judges could be receptive to arguments that the judiciary 
should take an “aggressive stance” in protecting minority rights.335 
Still, Anthony Michael Kries not only argues that recognition 
of same-sex marriage through legislative action, rather than judicial 
intervention, is consistent with a healthy balance of powers between 
branches of government,336 he concludes that the actions and debates 
of state legislators reflect a form of popular constitutionalism that 
helps to advance the development of constitutional rights: 
Indeed, the marriage equality movement has been propelled by elected 
officials whom, while representing diverse interests, engage in a 
deliberative democratic process as informed statesmen, interpreting the 
Constitution and squaring a distilled analysis of popular opinion with 
                                                     
332. Id. at 421 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
333. Delgado, supra note 283, at 527-28 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
failure to strike down bans on interracial marriage a dozen years earlier deprived 
interracial couples of important rights, harmed society as a whole, emboldened 
resistance to civil rights on other issues, and lessened the significance of Loving 
when it was issued); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 478-89 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, 
J., concurring) (the discrimination invalidated in Loving and Lawrence restricted 
freedoms in a way that infringed on the rights of all citizens of the state); see also id.
at 469 n.10 (the state’s unsupported speculation about adverse effects from same-sex 
marriage “cannot justify the indefinite continuation” of harmful discrimination). 
334. See, e.g., supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
335. SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 159-60 (reciting argument about an 
aggressive judicial stance, and stating that “the anti-caste principle . . . draws 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation into considerable doubt,” at least as 
a matter of “abstract constitutional theory”). But cf. id. at 160-62 (writing in 1999, 
prior to the backlash that led to numerous state constitutional amendments, that 
pragmatic and strategic considerations might justify a delay beyond 2001 or 2003 
before the Supreme Court invalidated a ban on same-sex marriage, even if the 
constitutional claim were clear).  
336. Anthony Michael Kreis, Marriage Equality in State and Nation, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 747, 750 (2014) (“[A] process in which courts give due 
diligence to consensus-driven constitutional interpretation in the legislative process 
while robustly exercising judicial review embraces a balance of constitutional 
prerogatives . . . .”).
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constitutional values through a dual cooperative citizen-legislator 
educational process—a hallmark of popular constitutionalism.337
Kreis concludes further that courts should look to legislative 
debates to enhance their understanding of constitutional rights:  
Through the legislative looking glass, courts can glean a popular 
understanding of constitutional provisions that have survived “the best test 
of truth” that underpins the “theory of our Constitution.”. . . As state and 
federal courts continue to assess the constitutional merits of challenges to 
state same-sex marriage bans, judges should give ample consideration to 
robust constitutional dialogue in state legislative bodies. In doing so, 
judges can enhance their own understanding of how same-sex marriage 
naturally fits within American constitutional history and tradition and 
bolster opinions extending constitutional protections to same-sex couples 
without ceding claims of furthering republican virtues to same-sex 
marriage opponents.338
On the other hand, judicial enlightenment from robust political 
debate need not preclude judicial protection of minority rights; this 
much is reflected in Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgment in 
Obergefell that decades of political and academic debate had indeed 
informed the Court before it acted to protect the right to marry.339
Moreover, Kreis tells the story of legislatures that retained the power 
under their state constitutions to recognize same-sex marriage. Steve 
Sanders argues that widespread state constitutional amendments 
denying recognition to same-sex marriage “represent a troubling 
failure of the political process”: 
By strong-arming marriage discrimination into state constitutions—which 
typically are far more difficult to change than ordinary statutes—during a 
relatively brief period from 1998 to 2012, mini-DOMA proponents 
intended to freeze marriage discrimination in place and put it beyond the 
reach of ordinary democratic deliberation, future legislative 
reconsideration, and state judicial review. And so the remaining mini-
DOMAs should receive searching, skeptical judicial review of their 
substance because they are the products of a constitutionally suspect 
lawmaking process.340
                                                     
337. Id. at 749 (citing generally to Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the 
Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative 
Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697 (2006)).  
338. Id. at 810 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 750 (“Courts adjudicating constitutional 
questions on issues previously subjected to intense legislative scrutiny, in turn, can 
then explore those well-reasoned constitutional interpretations for guidance.”). 
339. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
340. Sanders, supra note 114, at 14; see also id. at 15 (in early 2014, thirty-
one states banned same-sex marriage, twenty-eight by constitutional amendment, 
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Sanders argues that the state constitutional amendments, 
adopted “in an atmosphere that was often polluted by evident animus 
and ill will,”341 hampered “the process of democratic dialogue as 
translated through the normal legislative process,” undermining the 
argument for judicial restraint.342
In sum, judges should allow ample breathing space for 
democratic deliberation by deciding no more than the disputes before 
them and by subjecting state law to constitutional scrutiny rather 
than to scrutiny based on personal feelings or values.343 However, 
judges cannot dodge questions placed squarely before them, simply 
to defer to deliberation in another forum, and they must not fail to 
protect the legitimate rights of a minority simply to protect the 
sensibilities of a majority seeking to maintain the status quo.344
Indeed, in appropriate cases, and in contrast to Chief Justice 
Roberts’s admonition, a court can seek to smooth the way for an 
eventual consensus toward greater inclusiveness. Concurring in the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex marriage 
rights, Justice Greaney made a remarkable plea for acceptance: 
I am hopeful that our decision will be accepted by those thoughtful 
citizens who believe that same-sex unions should not be approved by the 
State. I am not referring here to acceptance in the sense of grudging 
acknowledgment of the court’s authority to adjudicate the matter. My 
hope is more liberating. The plaintiffs are members of our community, our 
neighbors, our coworkers, our friends. As pointed out by the court, their 
professions include investment advisor, computer engineer, teacher, 
                                                                                                               
even though a majority of the population of those states by then supported marriage 
equality, with greater majority support in the nation as a whole).  
341. Id. at 24. 
342. Id. at 25-26.
343. See Brassner v. Lade, No. 13-012058 (37), slip op. at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Aug. 4, 2014) (“With a full understanding of the politically and emotionally charged 
sentiments behind the issue of same-sex marriage, this Court’s analysis of the law 
and its ruling is based solely on the law, independent of bias, personal feelings or 
beliefs, which is the role of the judiciary.”).
344. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
316 (2014) (“Minorities trampled on by the democratic process have recourse to the 
courts; the recourse is called constitutional law.”). Or, as stated in one of the trial 
court opinions overturned by Judge Sutton: “Although . . . issuing an injunction will 
temporarily stay the enforcement of democratically enacted laws, that is essentially 
the case with any federal decision that overturns or stays enforcement of a state law 
that violates the federal Constitution.” Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 771 
(M.D. Tenn. 2014), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; see also Bonauto, supra note 18, at 37 (“[T]here has 
never been a marriage exception to the power of courts to decide constitutional 
questions.”).
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therapist, and lawyer. The plaintiffs volunteer in our schools, worship 
beside us in our religious houses, and have children who play with our 
children, to mention just a few ordinary daily contacts. We share a 
common humanity and participate together in the social contract that is the 
foundation of our Commonwealth. Simple principles of decency dictate 
that we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full acceptance, 
tolerance, and respect. We should do so because it is the right thing to 
do.345
C. Storytelling—An Advocate’s Invocation of Civil Rights History 
1. Legal Uncertainty, Leaving Room for Persuasion 
A theme of this Article is the tendency of our society to repeat 
civil rights history periodically, resisting each new claim for civil 
rights on similar grounds of religion, tradition, and personal views 
about what is natural.346 Later, we look back with some wonderment 
about how a previous generation could have defended slavery, racial 
segregation of public schools, bans on women practicing law and on 
married women entering into contracts, denial of women’s suffrage, 
and bans on interracial marriage.347 Yet, we seem to have a limited 
capacity for recognizing when we are in the midst of new civil rights 
struggles, ones that likely will prompt future generations to wonder 
how the current generation could have denied basic rights to 
minorities.348
In the struggle for same-sex marriage rights, and especially 
before the Supreme Court decided Windsor,349 courts faced legal 
uncertainty on the constitutional issues,350 as well as debates about 
the degree to which courts should proceed cautiously and defer to 
democratic deliberation.351 The marriage equality issue provides a 
                                                     
345. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003) 
(Greaney, J., concurring).  
346. See supra Section III.A.  
347. See supra Section III.A; see also supra notes 14-15, 264-66 and 
accompanying text (presenting and commenting on now embarrassingly outdated 
nineteenth century judicial statement about the natural place of women).  
348. The topic of this Article is same-sex marriage, but one could identify a 
number of other issues that could cause future generations to wonder at this one, 
such as wondering why we still cannot achieve equal pay for equal work, why we do 
not have the political will to tackle immigration reform, why many elected officials 
are apparently intent on voter suppression, and why members of various racial 
groups experience the criminal justice system in such a disparate manner.  
349. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra Part II. 
351. See supra Section II.C.  
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good example of the value of placing a civil rights issue in its 
historical context, to encourage judges to adopt the more favorable of 
competing analytic frameworks.352
2. The Appeal of the Civil Rights Story  
In the midst of a civil rights struggle, this Article proposes that 
advocates strive for progress in the courts by drawing parallels to 
previous civil rights struggles, by reminding judges of landmark 
decisions leading the way to progress in the face of injustice, and 
even by gently showing how a decision that cautiously maintains the 
status quo may be viewed one day as “a timid act that misjudged the 
times.”353
In judicial rulings on LGBT civil rights, courts themselves have 
occasionally made explicit reference to generational progress in civil 
rights. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the Lawrence majority 
referred to the difficulty of appreciating truths that a later generation 
will accept as obvious:  
[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment . . . knew times can blind us to 
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.354
Washington Supreme Court Justice Bobbe J. Bridge extended 
this thread from Lawrence in his dissent from the plurality’s opinion 
upholding that state’s mini-DOMA: “The passage of time and 
prudent judgment revealed the folly of Bowers, a mistake born of 
bigotry and flawed legal reasoning. Alas, the same will be said of 
this court’s decision today.”355 Justice Bridge ended her dissent with 
a particularly clear reference to the judgment of future generations: 
Future generations of justices on this court and future generations of 
Washingtonians will undoubtedly look back on our holding today with 
                                                     
352. See supra Part III. 
353. Delgado, supra note 283, at 531 (referring to the Supreme Court’s 
denying certiorari from a decision upholding a state ban on interracial marriage). 
354. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003); see also Latta v. 
Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing our constitutional history of 
“inclusion,” which “strengthens, rather than weakens, our most important 
institutions”).
355. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1028 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., 
concurring in dissent) (justice’s citation to Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-78 omitted), 
abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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regret and even shame, in the same way that our nation now looks with 
shame upon our past acts of discrimination. I will look forward to the time 
when state-sanctioned discrimination toward our gay and lesbian citizens 
is erased from our state’s law books, if not its history. I dissent.356
Such a generational perspective may not be sufficient to 
overcome the instinct of a more cautious judge to defer to ongoing 
democratic deliberation.357 In the Washington litigation, for example, 
the plurality opinion responded directly to Justice Bridge’s reference 
to future generations:  
Justice Bridge’s dissent claims that gay marriage will ultimately be on the 
books and that this court will be criticized for having failed to overturn 
DOMA. But, while same-sex marriage may be the law at a future time, it 
will be because the people declare it to be, not because five members of 
this court have dictated it.358
In sum, as with all forms of advocacy, the advocate must know 
her audience and advance arguments that will be most persuasive to 
that audience. Placing a novel claim within its larger context in civil 
rights history may be ineffective with some audiences. 
In many cases, however, if uncertainty in the law provides 
support for a court either maintaining the status quo or leading the 
way to the next stop on our country’s civil rights journey, a civil 
rights advocate may do well to explicitly place the claim within the 
larger historical context. Perhaps more attention to our past missteps 
and the likely judgment of future generations would have helped 
some judges to find that Baker v. Nelson was undermined after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, or even after the earlier 
decision of Romer, rather than waiting for Windsor.359 And it might 
have helped other courts to join the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 
                                                     
356. Id. at 1040. In this spirit, and in support of its decision striking down a 
ban on same-sex marriage, a Florida trial court opined that this form of 
discrimination would someday be viewed as such an anachronism that the 
classification itself would fall into disuse: “The Court . . . foresees a day when the 
term ‘same-sex marriage’ is viewed in the same absurd vein as ‘separate but equal’ 
and is thus forsaken and supplanted by ordinary ‘marriage.’” Pareto v. Ruvin, 
21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 899, 907 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2014) (citing to and quoting from 
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014)). 
357. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 283, at 526 (discussing the incrementalist 
view). 
358. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 969.  
359. See supra Section I.A.  
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finding a state constitutional right at a relatively early stage, 2003,360
rather than waiting for consensus in the general population. 
3. Techniques of Advocacy—Telling the Civil Rights Story 
In advancing the civil rights story, the advocate should 
remember that a theme or perspective, even when presented 
effectively, can do no more than encourage an undecided judge to 
lean toward one of two or more defensible interpretations of the law, 
such as deciding to define a fundamental right as a right to marriage
rather than a right to same-sex marriage.361 Moreover, “[t]he most 
persuasive writing style may be one that the judge hardly notices.”362
Accordingly, a perspective based on civil rights history might most 
gracefully appear in citations and analogies to conventional legal 
authority. For example, even at a relatively early stage of the 
movement for marriage equality, an advocate could cite to cases such 
as Perez and Loving in response to arguments that courts should 
delay until democratic deliberation has produced a consensus.363
But advocates should consider a more direct approach if they 
believe a court would be receptive to it.364 For example, in rejecting 
tradition and history as a basis for barring same-sex marriage, the 
Introduction to the Respondent’s brief in Hollingsworth v. Perry365
compared the current marriage equality issue to a number of civil 
rights landmarks:  
                                                     
360. See supra notes 116-19. The Hawaii Supreme Court set a positive 
precedent a decade before that, but it’s perhaps not realistic to think of the 
possibility of other courts following that example in light of the ensuing backlash. 
See supra notes 105-15. 
361. See supra Subsection II.D.1.  
362. CALLEROS, supra note 16, at 376; see also STEVEN D. STARK, WRITING 
TO WIN: THE LEGAL WRITER 149 (2012) (“Able litigators make clear arguments 
quietly, in contrast to many litigators who scream out an analysis in a way likely to 
be ignored.”); MEYER, supra note 20, at 3 (“[E]ffective storytelling demands that the 
audience not be distracted by, or even be aware of, the technical craft that shapes the 
material . . . .”). 
363. See Appendix (citing to the overturning of interracial marriage bans in 
Perez and Loving at times when popular opinion supported such bans). 
364. See generally WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
189-92 (2002) (explaining that judges are receptive to various kinds of arguments 
depending on their judicial philosophies). 
365. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (vacating decision below because 
proponents lacked standing to appeal, thus leaving in effect the trial court’s decision 
striking down California’s initiative banning same-sex marriage, Proposition 8). 
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If a history of discrimination were sufficient to justify its perpetual 
existence, as Proponents argue, our public schools, drinking fountains, and 
swimming pools would still be segregated by race, our government 
workplaces and military institutions would still be largely off-limits to one 
sex—and to gays and lesbians, and marriage would still be unattainable 
for interracial couples.366
Once the historical door is opened a crack, advocates should 
consider opening it fully with a more comprehensive treatment, at 
least in an amicus brief, which can provide a supplementary 
perspective. The multi-page Introduction in the Appendix is based on 
one that appeared in an amicus brief in 2004 in support of a petition 
for state supreme court review of a lower court’s decision upholding 
state bans on same-sex marriage.367 It was designed to encourage 
justices in a very conservative state to give serious consideration to 
the legal arguments that populated the remainder of the amicus brief. 
It represents a fairly bold approach, adopted by an amicus—the 
ACLU—that is known for bold advocacy. The state supreme court 
denied review without comment, leaving open to speculation 
whether the Introduction edged some justices closer to accepting the 
legal arguments of the amicus brief, was counter-productive with 
some justices, or had each of these effects with different justices.  
This author, however, promotes the idea of making explicit this 
nation’s civil rights history, and its probable projection into the 
future. In the right case, such a narrative can help courts and court 
watchers to fully appreciate the extent to which a denial of a new 
civil right, like marriage equality, will be viewed by future 
generations much the same way we view past denials of rights that 
we now take for granted. References to the arc of civil rights history 
could establish an underlying theme to a brief, could surface in 
occasional comparisons or predictions in oral argument, could 
anchor a brief or oral argument in an introduction to either, or could 
inform legislative committee reports and debates.  
If a character is a critical ingredient of storytelling,368 the 
central character of the story in the Appendix is the judiciary itself, 
cast in the role as hero,369 but with some flaws in its backstory.370 The 
                                                     
366. Brief for Respondent at 4, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 
2013 WL 648742. 
367. Brief of the Arizona Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners, Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, No. CV-03-
00422-PR (Ariz. Mar. 31, 2004). 
368. ROBBINS, et al., supra note 16, at 38. 
369. Cf. id. at 89 (discussing the “client as hero”). Federal judges in the Sixth 
Circuit have debated about the degree to which courts should play the role of hero. 
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conflict confronting this hero371 is the challenge of recognizing the 
place of the current dispute in historical context and reaching a just 
result, one that will withstand the test of time and the judgment of 
future generations, typically in the face of contrary popular opinion, 
and while working within the bounds of precedent and with 
appropriate regard for democratic deliberation in other forums. 
CONCLUSION 
The progression of civil rights is not a single story with an 
ending. Rather, it is a continuing narrative. Indeed, marriage equality 
will not spell the end of the civil rights movement for the LGBT 
community; challenges remain, for example, in securing equality in 
employment, adoption, housing, and public accommodations.372 And, 
we have hardly seen the end of our continuing quest for racial 
equality, including in the criminal justice system.373 Perhaps the new 
and continuing struggles will benefit from a broad historical 
perspective, adopted by farsighted jurists, with the gentle urging of 
graceful advocates.  
                                                                                                               
Supra text accompanying notes 331, 332. Robbins cautions against casting the judge 
in the role of hero in litigation, arguing that the client should be cast as hero, because 
it allows the client to possess flaws and still be considered in a positive light. 
Robbins, supra note 16, at 775-77. This author, however, argues that litigation can 
present different stories at various levels: The same-sex couple may play the role of 
hero in the underlying dispute and in their quest for equal rights and dignity, while 
the judiciary can play the role of hero in the separate story of the law itself and its 
journey through generations of changing social norms. See generally supra notes 16-
21 and accompanying text. 
370. See ROBBINS, et al., supra note 16, at 91-92 (discussing the client’s 
backstory, the inevitable unfavorable facts in a story, and flaws in the hero of the 
story).  
371. See id. at 96-98 (discussing the need of a story to pose a conflict or 
obstacle for the protagonist to overcome before reaching a goal).  
372. See, e.g., Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the 
Unfinished Business of Formal Equality, 125 YALE L.J.F. 1 (2015).  
373. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 62-78 (March 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (finding unlawful discriminatory intent and 
disparate impact in policing practices affecting the African-American community). 
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE INTRODUCTION TO A BRIEF
The following Introduction is taken, with some editing and 
revision, from an Introduction drafted by this author for a brief to 
the Arizona Supreme Court in 2004;374 accordingly, it does not rely 
on authority beyond that date. The story it tells seeks to place 
Arizona courts in the role of hero, summoning the courage to blaze a 
trail for constitutional rights, as an Arizona court had done so nearly 
a half-century earlier when it struck down Arizona’s anti-
miscegenation law. Although it mainly looks backward, to draw 
historical parallels to the current dispute, it also glances forward, to 
remind the justices that future generations will assess this 
generation’s response to a plea for equal rights.
I. Introduction—Lessons from Loving 
Throughout our nation’s history, American courts have come to 
the aid of minority groups that large segments of the population 
viewed with fear, derision, or condescension. Although courts accord 
appropriate deference to the majority will as expressed through 
democratic institutions, they have also recognized that some 
constitutional principles are designed to protect minority groups 
from oppression at the hands of those who are sufficiently numerous, 
powerful, or motivated to wield control of political processes. See 
generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional 
amendment, approved by voters in a statewide referendum, that 
infringed on fundamental rights of gay and lesbian citizens to 
participate in the political process).  
In striking down a state law that limited jury service to “white 
male . . . citizens,” the Supreme Court described an important goal of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a 
necessary implication of a positive immunity . . . the right to exemption 
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored—
                                                     
374. Based on the Introduction, Brief of the Arizona Civil Liberties Union as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2-9, Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel.
Cty. of Maricopa, No. CV-03-00422-PR (Ariz. Mar. 31, 2004), petitioning for 
review from 77 P.3d 451 (2003), review denied No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150 (Ariz. S. Ct. 
May 26, 2004). 
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exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, 
and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the 
condition of a subject race. 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). 
In retrospect, the judicial decisions that recognized emerging 
civil rights are viewed today as courageous, principled, and 
prescient, while opponents of civil rights movements, and the 
discriminatory laws that they championed, are viewed as 
embarrassing anachronisms of a less enlightened past. In the 
nineteenth century, for example, the United States Supreme Court 
might have seemed sensible and appropriately cautious when it 
upheld a state’s ban on the admission of women to the practice of 
law. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). Especially anachronistic 
now, however, is Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion, in which he 
sought to justify the state legislation as an appropriate reflection of 
social and religious values: 
. . . [T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man 
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it 
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family 
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to 
say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the 
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct 
and independent career from that of her husband. . . . 
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
Much more recently, “sex” as a protected classification was 
introduced into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at the last 
minute by a Southern congressman who opposed the bill; he 
apparently gambled that a majority of his colleagues would be so 
repulsed by the notion of equal rights in the workplace for women 
that they would withdraw their support from the entire bill. See
Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate 84, 115-16 
(1985). Although his strategy backfired, his confidence in the 
strategy—just forty years ago—reflected the fragility of popular and 
legislative support for equal rights that we take for granted today. 
Today, some religions may still preach the benefits of recognizing 
starkly different roles for men and women, but few would seriously 
dispute the wisdom of equal rights for women in the employment 
arena. 
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Of the profiles in judicial courage, perhaps the most celebrated 
is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), striking down 
racial segregation in public educational facilities. The principle of 
Brown is beyond any serious debate today, but it cut hard against the 
grain of segregationist state legislative and executive policies that 
persisted for many years after the decision. In 1962, for example, 
Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett, cheered by state legislators, gave 
action and voice to popular sentiment against admitting an African-
American student to the University of Mississippi, relenting only to 
overwhelming pressure from the federal judicial and executive 
branches. Taylor Branch, Parting of the Waters 597-98, 647-72 
(1988). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of 
a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses family planning 
and contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), cut 
against the grain of popular moral sensibilities that were reflected at 
the time in state legislation and that are still reflected in opposition to 
contraception in some religions.  
The Arizona court system, too, can lay claim to a particularly 
proud moment when an Arizona Superior Court, rather than waiting 
for evolution in democratic institutions, upheld a constitutional right 
to interracial marriage. Oyama v. O’Neil, No. 61269 (Pima Cty. 
Superior Court, Dec. 23, 1959). In Oyama, Judge Herbert Krucker 
struck down a state law banning interracial marriage seven years 
before the United States Supreme Court accomplished that task for 
the nation in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Judge Krucker 
did not bow to public opinion, which then supported interracial 
marriage bans.  
The wisdom and foresight reflected in Oyama stands in stark 
contrast to the words of the Indiana Supreme Court, which upheld a 
state legislative ban on interracial marriage by reciting popular 
religious and social values: 
In this State marriage is treated as a civil contract but it is more than a 
mere civil contract. It is a public institution established by God himself, is 
recognized in all Christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the 
peace, . . . happiness, and well-being of society . . . . The right, in the 
states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-
given, civilizing and Christianizing institution is of inestimable 
importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit 
any interference therewith. 
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402-03 (1871) (as quoted with approval 
in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 84 (1955)). The court in Gibson further 
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used religion and tradition to shield itself from being portrayed as 
discriminatory: 
[Interracial marriage bans stem not from] prejudice, nor caste, nor 
injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to follow the law of the 
races established by the creator himself, and not to compel them to 
intermix contrary to their instincts.  
Id. at 405. 
Other courts invoked tradition to justify the invidious 
discrimination inherent in interracial bans. For example, in addition 
to quoting the passage from Gibson with approval, the Virginia 
Supreme Court justified its approval of a ban on interracial marriage 
by referring to cultural traditions and state interests in regulating the 
institution of marriage: 
The institution of marriage has from time immemorial been considered a 
proper subject for State regulation in the interest of the public health, 
morals and welfare, to the end that family life, a relation basic and vital to
the permanence of the State, may be maintained in accordance with 
established tradition and culture and in furtherance of the physical moral 
and spiritual well-being of its citizens. 
Naim, 197 Va. at 89. 
Other courts and public officials justified bans on interracial 
marriage by invoking concerns about procreation and child-rearing. 
The Georgia Supreme Court, for example, stated that “amalgamation 
of the races is not only unnatural, but it is also productive of 
deplorable results.” Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). In 
California, a county clerk defended the state ban on interracial 
marriage partly by arguing that “the progeny of a marriage between a 
Negro and a Caucasian suffer not only the stigma of such inferiority 
but the fear of rejection by members of both races.” In Perez v. 
Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948). 
Fortunately, in Perez, the California Supreme Court declared 
that state’s anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional, despite the 
State’s warnings that the multi-racial offspring of interracial 
marriages would not fare well in our society. Id. at 18. Yet one 
wishes for the opportunity to visit the segregationists of decades past, 
or those who opposed equal employment opportunities for women, 
and ask them to consider the natural evolution of society and to 
predict how their actions would appear to the next generation and 
beyond. If only they could have recognized their eras as ones of 
historic transition in our society, transition for positive change that 
was long overdue. 
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Loving, Brown, Perez, and Oyama demonstrate that courts 
often make decisions that cut against deeply and religiously held 
societal ideals and values. Similar to the opponents of gender 
equality, family planning, and interracial marriages, those opposed to 
same-sex marriage invoke the Bible, natural law, and the welfare of 
children. Fortunately, our nations’ social values have evolved and 
our judiciary has helped society accept basic constitutional rights that 
stand separate from private religious convictions. Otherwise, 
contraception and interracial marriage would still be barred, and 
women would be the property of their husbands. See Bradwell v. 
State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (describing 
the highly restricted legal status of married women in the nineteenth 
century, which helped to justify barring women from the practice of 
law). 
The Arizona Civil Liberties Union (“AzCLU”) predicts that 
laws that bar loving, committed same-sex couples from securing full 
marriage rights will eventually be viewed the way that we now look 
back on racial segregation, discrimination against women, and anti-
miscegenation laws. The percentage of Americans who favored 
“laws against marriages between Negroes and Whites” stood at 53% 
in 1964, just three years before Loving v. Virginia. Hazel Erskine, 
The Polls: Interracial Socializing, 37 Pub. Opinion Q., 283, 291 
(1973). When asked in a 1968 Gallup poll about their personal 
approval or disapproval of “marriage between whites and non-
whites/blacks,” rather than their support for laws banning such 
marriages, a substantial 72% disapproved. Id. at 292. In comparison, 
53% of Americans stated in January 2004 that they would oppose a 
law allowing same-sex marriage, and 65% of participants opposed 
same-sex marriage when they were not allowed the neutral choice of 
“no opinion.” American Public Opinion About Gay and Lesbian 
Marriages, Gallup (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
focus/sr040127.asp.  
Even the religious hostility toward same-sex marriage likely 
will fade in most churches with the passage of time and the evolution 
of society, so that current hostility will strike the same sour note that 
Justice Bradley’s once timely concurrence in Bradwell strikes today. 
More tellingly, although some religions may continue to promote the 
biblical condemnation of homosexuality and concept of “sanctity of 
marriage” that excludes same-sex marriage, our society soon will 
leave such religious matters to religion and make governmental 
discrimination obsolete. 
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In light of the prospect of societal evolution, some might argue 
that same-sex couples should wait for democratic institutions to 
reflect majority support for same-sex marriage. True, in periods of 
transition, courts often proceed cautiously, allowing democratic 
deliberation to help define solutions in a variety of political arenas, 
rather than leading the way with bold judicial strokes. See Cass 
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court (1999). A few times in a generation, however, in a time of 
great social transition, a case implicates the plight of a minority 
group that cannot count on majority-controlled political processes for 
progress and should not be compelled to wait to exercise their 
constitutional rights. It is in cases such as these that a courageous and 
forward-looking court has the opportunity, if not the duty, to help 
lead the way, securing equal rights with decisions such as that of 
Arizona Superior Court in Oyama v. O’Neil. 
Interestingly, judicial recognition of constitutional rights to 
same-sex marriage is analytically a relatively easy step. Under one 
analytic framework, a state law discriminates on the basis of race 
when it provides that a Black woman can marry a Black man but that 
a White woman cannot. By the same token, a state law discriminates 
on the basis of sex when it provides that a man can marry a woman, 
but another woman cannot. Alternatively, a court can recognize, 
under either the state or federal constitution, that a marriage statute 
limited to same-sex couples is not rationally related to a legitimate 
state policy, particularly when evidence shows that the asserted state 
policy masks a general antipathy toward same-sex couples. 
These and other analytic arguments are discussed in this brief. 
They can be accepted or rejected by courts with relative ease, 
depending on the values that are placed on the end result and 
depending on our collective sense of this dispute’s place in evolution 
of our society. As stated by Justice Blackmun, dissenting from a 
decision limiting the parameters of substantive due process: 
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves . . . the 
Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by 
existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this 
case is an open one, and our 14th Amendment precedents may be read 
more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. 
Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one which 
comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that 
compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.  
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Blackmun’s inspiring words did not carry the
day in DeShaney, the eventual recognition of the invidious nature of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is all but inevitable 
within our generation and the next. Same-sex marriage may seem as 
controversial now as inter-racial marriage seemed a half-century ago, 
but the Arizona Superior Court waded into the struggle for civil 
rights in the earlier battle. The current quest for equal treatment 
under the law for loving, committed gay and lesbian couples has 
equal merit.  
Moreover, a decision prohibiting government from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation in marriage licenses 
does not foreclose a variety of personal and religious beliefs and 
practices in the conducting of marriage ceremonies. The granting of 
a marriage license would not compel any private person authorized 
to perform a marriage ceremony to marry any couple other than one 
that satisfies the criteria demanded by the religious organization with 
which he or she is affiliated. As a result, some couples may be 
excluded from, for example, marriage ceremonies in the Catholic 
Church and will be satisfied to be married by a Justice of the Peace. 
Such is the proper venue for the expression of the view that same-sex 
marriage does not comport with popular views about the “sanctity of 
marriage.”

